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OPNION varies sharply concerning the extent to which relief should
be granted from a judgment. This divergence necessarily results from
a clash of the two principles that litigation must terminate within a rea-
sonable time, but that justice must be accorded the parties. The neces-
sity of expediting litigation to a conclusion is universally recognized,
but the federal system is the only one which is outstandingly successful
in actually clearing dockets and keeping abreast of judicial business.
This success is attributable to a number of factors: a fairly adequate
number of judges for the district courts and circuit courts of appeal;
the organization of the federal judiciary so that district and circuit
judges may be freely transferred both within circuits and to other cir-
cuits, which shifts surplus manpower to courts with congested dockets;
an increasing pressure by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges and
the Judicial Councils within each circuit that stale actions be dismissed
and live actions be tried; the Administrative Office for the United
States Courts which arms the Conference and Councils with data on
judicial business and assists administratively in implementing their de-
cisions; the general limitation of the right of appeal from a district to a
circuit court of appeals to an appeal from a final judgment; the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction which is based largely upon the
Court's discretion in granting certiorari, with the attendant sharp limi-
tation on the Court's obligatory jurisdiction invoked by appeal; and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which have provided a simple and
direct procedure for the presentation of claims, the formulation of issues,
and their adjudication in the district courts.
Certainty in litigation is substantially affected by two concepts.
The theory that litigation must end is conceptually ex\ pressed by res
judicata which confers something approaching absolute stability upon
final judgments. Certainty in arriving at those judgments is pro-
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mated by stare decisis. Briefly stated, the term res judicata is often
used to denote two legal effects of a final judgment: (1) that such a
judgment upon the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action be-
tween the same parties, or those in privity, upon the same claim or
demand; and (2) that such a judgment constitutes an estoppel as to
matters that were necessarily litigated and determined although the
claim or demand in the subsequent action is different.' The doctrine
of judicial finality and its underlying policy have been well stated by
Mr. Justice Harlan:
"This general rule is demanded by the very object for which civil
courts have been established, which is to secure the peace and re-
pose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial de-
termination. Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of
social order; for the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked
for the vindication of rights of person and property, if, as between
parties and their privies, conclusiveness did not attend the judg-
ments of such tribunals in respect of all matters properly put in
issue and actually determined by them." 2
Composed as it is of two recognized polar elements, stare decisis
necessarily commands less finality. The affirmative element requires a
particular court, and all courts owing obedience to it, to abide by the
rules of law evolved in prior cases by it, or by any court to which it
owes obedience. The negative element, always at war with the positive,
accords all American courts, unlike the House of Lords with its pro-
fessed infallibility, the power and duty, under certain circumstances, of
self-correction of error.3 Mr. Justice Brandeis has stated the duty
of a court in this manner:
1. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1942) § 2.044 (hereinafter cited as MOoRr).
As there pointed out the term res judicata may be technically limited to the first matter;
and the term estoppel by judgment applied to the second matter. Since the policy under-
lying both technical res judicata and estoppel by judgment lead to the same objective--
judicial finality-we need make no technical differentiation for our purpose and hence will
use res judicata as including estoppel by judgment.
2. Southern Pacific R. R. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 49 (1897). In similar vein
Mr. Justice Clarke reasoned: "This doctrine of resjudicata is not a mere matter of practice
or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and
substantial justice, 'of public policy and of private peace,' which should be cordially re-
garded and enforced by the courts to the end that rights once established by the final judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be recognized by those who are bound by it in
every way, wherever the judgment is entitled to respect." Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply
Co., 244 U. S. 294, 299 (1917).
3. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 121 (1940): "This Court, unlike the House
of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction."; Moore
and Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of the Case (1943) 21 TEX. L. REV.
514. For the House of Lords rule, see London Street Tramways Co. v. London County
Council [1898] A. C. 375.
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"Stare decisis is not, like the rule of resjudimla , a universal, inexor-
able command. 'The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to
consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it
shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided.' . . . Stare decisis is usually the wise policy,
because in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right. . . This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern,
provided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involv-
ing the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative
action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its
earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in
the judicial function." I
Exercise of the power of self-correction by the present Court in re-
orienting itself and recording the judicial shift, particularly in public
law cases, has caused much comment and criticism, perhaps the sharp-
est from the Court's own personnel. Mr. Justice Roberts, in particular,
has said:
"This tendency . . . indicates an intolerance for what those who
have composed this court in the past have conscientiously and de-
liberately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge
and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors . . .
the instant decision . . . tends to bring adjudications of this tri-
bunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for
this day and train only. . . . It is regrettable that in an era marked
by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness
of thought and purpose, this court . . . should now itself become
the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to
the stability of our institutions." 5
4. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,405-8 (1932) (Brandeis dkzent-
ing). Skx years later the Burnet case was overruled. Helvering v. Producers Corporation,
303 U. S. 376 (1938).
5. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,666-70 (1944). See also his statement in Mahnich
v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, 113 (1944): "Respect for tribunals must fall when the
bar and the public come to understand that nothing that has been said in prior adjudication
has force in a current controversy. Of course the law may grow to meet changing conditions.
I do not advocate slavish adherence... The tendency to disregard precedents in the de-
cision of cases like the present has become so strong in this court of late, as, in my vier., to
shake confidence in the consistency of decision and leave the courts below on an uncharted
sea of doubt and difficulty without any confidence that what was said yesterday will hold
good tomorrow. . . ." For other comment, see Sprecher, The Dcrdoprct= ofA- Do:lrirc of
Stare Decisis and the Extent to Wlhich It Should Be Applied (1945) 31 A. B. A. J. 501; Grinnell,
The New Guesspotism (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 507; (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 484 (comment of the
Texas Bar); Moore and Oglebay, loc. cit. supra note 3.
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Whether this criticism is too extreme need not detain us. All concede,
including Justice Roberts, that a slavish adherence to the past is not
desirable. Precedent must often be modified to prevent injustice.
The problem is to restrict the power of self-correction along generally
acceptable channels.
justice also requires that the finality behind res judicata be subject
to corrective power. But again, the difficulty in drawing the line be-
comes apparent. After surveying the exceptions in many states to the
doctrine of finality of judgments, Freeman, a recognized authority,
makes this stricture generally, although with specific reference to New
York:
".. . judgments seem to be regarded not as inviolate and enduring
testimonials, but as temporary structures, to be torn down, re-
modeled or rebuilt whenever the builders feel competent to improve
the original workmanship or design." 6
Whether this comment, like Roberts' criticism of stare decisis in the
Supreme Court, is too caustic need not be analyzed. The fact remains
that res judicata is not an inexorable command. It would be intolerable
if it were. Thus, direct attacks upon the judgment, as by motion for
new trial or by appeal, have become accepted and standardized chal-
lenges to the finality of a judgment. On the other hand, a motion to
vacate a judgment for fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect; the ancillary remedies of coram nobis, audita querela,
and bill of review; the doctrine of inherent power in a court to correct
its adjudications; the independent action in equity to enjoin the en-
forcement of a judgment; and collateral attack offer uncertain yet
extensive and dangerous weapons for assault upon finality.
Finality of judgments and stare decisis are but facets of acceptable
judicial administration. Because adherence to precedent affects
countless persons, who did not have their day in court when the prec-
edent was established, and because law must change with conditions,
the doctrine of stare decisis must be handled in a manner responsive to
the best creative effort of the judicial process. This demands the ut-
most in flexibility of treatment. Finality of judgments, on the other
hand, deals with an adjudication made on the law and the facts as of a
particular time, and directly affects only a very limited number of
persons-the litigants and those in privity. Quite naturally the ad-
judication should be conclusive, subject to some correctional power.
How far this power can be categorized and restricted within rather
well defined boundaries is the problem before us.
FEDERAL RULE 60
Background of the Rule. Federal Rule 60 is the rule which deals
specifically with relief from civil judgments of federal district courts.
6. 1 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (6th ed. 1925) 388.
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When the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee originally had before
it the adoption of the Rules, which the Court subsequently promulgated
in 1938, the Committee carefully considered the problem of finality,
its general desirability, and its relationship to a number of rules. At
that time the term of court was the critical factor in the district court's
power over its final judgments at law and in equity. While the district
court had plenary power over such judgments during the term, it was
in general without power to reconsider its final judgments at law and
in equity after the expiration of the term, unless (1) the proceeding
seeking relief was begun within the term, or (2) the court, during the
term, reserved control over the judgment and the proceeding seeking
relief was begun within that extended period.7 A good illustration of
the inflexibility of the term rule is to be found in United States v.
.11ayer.8 In that case a motion for a new trial on the ground of the con-
cealed bias of a juror was made as soon as the bias was discovered, but
after the expiration of the term at which the judgment of conviction
was entered and over which the court had not reserved control. The
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hughes, followed the
theory that the district court lacked power to consider the motion; and
that as there was no general jurisdiction over the subject matter after
term time the consent of the United States attorney that the motion
be heard was unavailing. Mr. Justice Hughes stated clearly that the
rule was applicable to both civil and criminal actions; "the general
principle obtains," he said, "that a court cannot set aside or alter its
final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it wnas entered,
unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during that term." 0
Exceptions to this general rule were the utilization, under certain cir-
cumstances, of the ancillary remedies of coram nobis, coram vobis,
audita querela, bill of review and bill in the nature of a bill of reviewv-
remedies which had grown up to give relief after term time in certain
limited situations; the occasional utilization of the doctrine of the
court's inherent power over its judgments; and the independent action
in equity to enjoin enforcement of a judgment. So inflexible was the
general rule that in order to make it workable and yet bring them-
selves within its purview, many district courts established local rules
extending the term for a specified period from the date of the entry of a
final judgment to retain jurisdiction and power over such judgment
for a sufficient time to allow application for relief to be made.10
On the other hand in bankruptcy where the court sat continuously
7. Zimmern v. United States, 298 U. S. 167 (1936) (equity); D. L. & AV. R. R. v.
Rellstab, 276 U. S. 1 (1928) (law); United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 (1914) (law-crimi-
nal); In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U. S. 312 (1910) (equity).
8. 235 U. S. 55 (1914), cited supra note 7.
9. Id. at 67.
10. 1 MooRE at 415-6.
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and had no terms, the rule was otherwise. The bankruptcy court had
the power for good reason to revise its judgments upon seasonable
application and before rights had vested on the faith of its action.11
Faced with these alternatives the Committee could have adopted the
bankruptcy rule for civil actions, at law and in equity, and subjected
the finality of civil judgments to a sound, albeit a rather vague, prin-
ciple. Quite naturally the Committee adopted a more conservative
approach. Definite time limits were substituted in lieu of the term rule
which operated unequally, since the time for vacating a judgment
rendered early in a term was much longer than for a judgment ren-
dered near its end. It was not practicable to abolish terms of court
which Congress had established for the purpose of requiring a district
court to sit at definitely specified times and places throughout the dis-
trict.12 So the Committee first provided in Rule 6(c) that the expira-
tion of a term of court should in no way affect "the power of a court
to do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been
pending before it." It then stated in Rule 58 the precise time when a
judgment should be considered entered and effective: "The notation of
a judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79(a) constitutes
the entry of the judgment; and the judgment is not effective before
such entry." From this established point, definite and rather short
time limits were provided for the making of motions which would affect
the finality of a judgment, arrest the running of appeal time, and start
the full time for appeal running anew from the disposition of any or all
of these motions. 13 These motions and time limits were: a motion under
Rule 50(b) for judgment in accordance with a motion for directed
verdict-within 10 days after the reception of a verdict, or, if a verdict
was not returned, within 10 days after the jury has been discharged;
a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings and
amend the judgment accordingly-not later than 10 days after entry
of a judgment; a motion under Rule 59 for new trial-'not later than
10 days after the entry of the judgment, except that a motion for a new-
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made after
the expiration of such period and before the expiration of the time for
appeal, with leave of court obtained on notice and hearing and on a
showing of due diligence." '1 The Committee did not deal with the
time for appeal either from the district court to the Supreme Court or
11. Wayne Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 300 U. S. 131 (1937). Applicability of
the doctrine of this case is further dealt with in considering the time for appeal under the
proposed amendment to Rule 73(a). See infra, p. 690, note 261.
12. 1 MooPaat417.
13. See infra, p. 690, for discussion of the effect of these motions upon appeal time in
relation to the proposed amendment of Rule 73(a).
14. The quoted provision comes from Rule 59(b), which deals with a motion for new
trial made by a party. Rule 59(d) provides that the court may on its own initiative order a
new trial; here, too, the time limit is 10 days after entry of judgment.
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from the district court to the circuit court of appeals, but left the
statutory appeal periods intact, i" which for the great bulk of appeals
that go to the circuit court of appeals would mean a period of three
months. 6 Finally it established in Rule 60 a general time limit of six
months for relief from judgments, although as shall be noted the excep-
tions contained in the rule gave a court certain power over its judg-
ments for a much longer period of time.
It will be recalled that United States v. Mayer 27 proceeded on the
theory that the expiration of the term terminated the court's jurisdic-
tion over its final judgments, subject to the established exceptions at
common law and equity underlying the ancillary remedies and the
independent action to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment. But
since Rule 82 states that "These rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts . . .," it follows that
the Committee and the Court in abrogating the effect of the term
upon the court's power over its judgments and substituting definite
time limits did not follow the jurisdictional theory of the Mayer case.
This course of action was eminently sound. Historically, the term
rule can be adequately explained as a rule of repose (somewhat anal-
ogous to a statute of limitations), which the common law and equity
courts invoked to give finality to their judgments. Thus, when these
courts evolved the ancillary remedies, such as coram nobis and bill of
review, and the independent action in equity, which gave relief long
after term time, they were not enlarging their jurisdiction, but were
merely recognizing that under certain circumstances their self-imposed
15. Rules 72, 73(a).
16. In civil cases governed by the Federal Rules, the time for appeal to a circuit court
of appeals from a final judgment is normally 3 months after the entry of judgment. 43 STAT.
940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 230 (1940). An exception to this is made by 45 U. S. C. § 159 (1940)
which provides only 10 days for an appeal from the judgment of the district court upon an
award of a board of arbitration under the Railway Labor Act. The time for appeal from
certain interlocutory judgments or orders in proceedings for injunctions and in receivership
proceedings, and from a judgment in an action for infringement of letters patent, which is
final except for the ordering of an accounting, is 30 days. 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C.
§§ 227, 227a (1940). The time for appeal from the District Court to the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia is regulated by Rule 10 of the latter court's rule and was 20
days. After the decision of the district court but prior to that of the Court of Appeals in
Hill v. Hawes and on February 1, 1941, the latter court amended Rule 10 to substitute a
period of 30 days for the 20 days theretofore provided. See Hill v. Hawes, 320 U. S. 520,
521 (1944).
In bankruptcy under § 25a, appeals may be taken to the Circuit Court vithin 30 days
after notice of the entry of judgment. This time limit is also subject to the maximum
period of 40 days after entry if no such notice is given. 2 CoLLriu on Bm murzcy (14th
ed., 1940) 898-901.
The time periods for direct appeal from a district court to the Supreme Court are not
uniform. In the main they are 60 and 30 days, respectively, from the entry of a final judg-
ment and interlocutory judgment. 1 Moo=n 398-400.
17. 235 U. S. 55 (1914), cited su'ra notes 7-9.
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rule of repose should be relaxed. Also from a practical point of view,
term time should not be regarded as jurisdictional, since a court nor-
mally does not have the right under its rule-making power to deal with
jurisdiction, yet the grounds for and the time within which relief may
be obtained from judgments are technical matters which are better
regulated by rules of court than by statutes. It is true that the Court,
by promulgating the Federal Rules, did not foreclose a litigant from
challenging the validity of any rule or rules.'8 Neverthless, considera-
tion by the Committee and the Court, respectively, in recommending
and promulgating the Rules is entitled to great weight.'9 When this
factor is coupled with the historical background of the term rule and
the practical reason for dealing by rule of court with relief from judg-
ments, the validity of the Rules dealing with this matter is not to be
seriously doubted.
Rule 6o as Promulgated. A rule dealing directly with relief from a
judgment should dealwith at least two matters: clerical mistakes; and
grounds of a more serious proportion, which for convenience may be
described as substantive in character. The first matter had been rather
adequately covered by Equity Rule 72 as interpreted, and since the
Committee utilized generally the sound features of the Equity Rules it
adopted the substance of the equity rule dealing with clerical mistakes.
It, therefore, provided in subdivision (a) of Rule 60 that
"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be cor-
18.- Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U. S. 1 (1941) (Rule 35 providing for physical
and mental examination unsuccessfully challenged on the ground that it affects substan-
tive right); Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 66 Sup. Ct. 242 (U. S. 1946) (Rule 4()
allowing a summons to be served outside the territorial limits of a district but within the
territorial limits of the state where the district court is held does not enlarge jurisdiction).
See also the Committee's Note to Rule 23(b), which provides, among other things, that In a
shareholders' secondary action the complaint "shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a share-
holder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter
devolved on him by operation of law." The Committee states that "As a result of the deci-
sion in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (decided April 25, 1938, after this rule was pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court, though before it took effect) a question has arisen as to
whether the provision above quoted deals with a matter of substantive right or is a matter of
procedure. If it is a matter of substantive law or right, then under Eric R. Co. v. Tompkins
clause (1) may not be validly applied in cases pending in states whose local law permits a
shareholder to maintain such actions, although not a shareholder at the time of the transac-
tions complained of. The Advisory Committee, believing the question sfiould be settled in
the courts, proposes no change in Rule 23 ... " Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments (1945) 24-25.
19. See cases cited supra note 18; Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986, 992 (S. D. N. Y.
1938), Judge Leibell in sustaining the validity of Equity Rule 27, the predecessor of Federal
Rule 23(b), note 18 supra, which was not then in effect, stated: "If Equity Rule 27 is to be
modified or revoked in view of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, it is not the province of this Court
to suggest it, much less impliedly to follow that course by disregarding the mandatory pro-
visions of the Rule." See (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev. 823.
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rected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion
of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." -
This provision has proved generally satisfactory.2 1
Relative to matters of substance the Committee, however, did not
have an adequate model in either the common law or equity practice,
since these were geared to term time. Upon the strong recommenda-
tion of its member from California, Mr. 'Warren Olney, Jr., the Com-
mittee substantially adopted the California practice in the first tvo
sentences (particularly the first) of Rule 60(b). Section 473 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"Relief from judgment taken by mistake, etc. The court may, upon
such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal representative
from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
Application for such relief must be accompanied by a copy of the
answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the
application shall not be granted, and must be made within a rea-
sonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after such judgment,
order or proceeding was taken.' --
20. Although Equity Rule 72 provided that corrections could be made "at any time
before the close of the term at which final decree is rendered," the rule vms invo!:ed to correct
clerical mistakes after term time. Ommen v. Talcott, ISO Fed. 925 (S. D. N. Y. 1910). app.
dism'd, 231 U. S. 761 (1913) (the case deals with old Equity Rule 85 from which Equity
Rule 72 was derived); see In re Wight, 134 U. S. 136 (1890). Situations in which corrections
have been made under Rule 60(a) or its predecessors are: misstatement as to date of entry
of decree, Ommen v. Talcott, supra; incorrect date from which interest on mortgage debt waa
to be computed, Fidelity Ins. Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co., 84 Fed. 744,
(C. C. IV. D. Va. 1898); misstatement of designation of letters patent transferred to vife
under separate maintenance decree, Magnn v. Standard Equipment Co., 150 Fed. 139
(C. C. A. 7th, 1906); incorrect place of sale under foreclosure decree, Fulton Inv. Co. v.
Dorsey, 220 Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); failure to include interest, Rigopoulas v. Kervan,
53 F. Supp. 829 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); misstatement of petitioner's birthdate in naturalization
records, even though the error was petitioner's and not the court's, Application of Levis,
46 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1942); misstatement of petitioner's name in naturalization records,
Matter of Garcia, 9 Fed. Rules Serv. 60a. 11, Case 1 (W. D. Pa. 1946); failure of lower court
to enter a judgment dismissing a petition in a bankruptcy case, Crosby v. Pacific S. S. Line,
133 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943). See 126 A. L. R. 956 (1940) for general treatment of
the problem of clerical mistakes.
21. The only problem arising under the provision has been whether or not mistake3
may be corrected by a district court after an appeal has been taken. The propoced amend-
ments espressly provide that mistakes may be corrected before the appeal is docketed in the
appellate court, and after docketing if the appellate court grants leave to do so. Second
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments (1945) Rule 60(a), infra note 264.
22. The quoted provision is the third paragraph of § 473. The fourth and concluding
paragraph of the section is quite similar to Rule 60(a), but is broader in that it provides for
the setting aside of a void judgment or order. It reads:
"Correction of clerical mistakes in judgnwnts or orders. Selling aside roid judgme, t or
order. The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical
mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order di-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Rule 60(b) reads:
"(b) MISTAKE; INADVERTENCE; SURPRISE; EXCUSABLE NEG-
LECT. On motion the court, upon such terms as are just, may re-
lieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order or
proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such
judgment, order, or proceeding was taken. A motion under this
subdivision does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court (1) to enter-
tain an action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or pro-
ceeding, or (2) to set aside within one year, as provided in Section
57 of the Judicial Code, U. S. C., Title 28, § 118, a judgment ob-
tained against a defendant not actually personally notified."
It can thus be seen that the first sentence of Rule 60(b) is taken al-
most literally from the California section; that only verbal adaptations
,were made. By providing a six-months' time limit, the second sentence
of Rule 60(b) adopts the substance of the second sentence of the Cali-
fornia section. Also, the practice prescribed by the Rule is substan-
tially similar to that of its model, although the two may vary some-
what, since a motion under Rule 7(b) (1) must state the grounds there-
for but need not be accompanied by a proposed answer or other plead-
ing as provided in the California section. The California provision and
the federal adaptation are deficient in that they do not expressly
recognize fraud as a basis for relief by motion, although the deficiency
has been met by decisional emendation.13
The balance of Rule 60(b)-the two concluding sentences-has no
* counterpart in the California practice act. The first of these sentences
states clearly that the motion does not affect the finality of the judg-
ment, hence does not enlarge appeal time; and does not suspend its
operation, hence does not affect any lien or other right the judgment
may establish nor its effect as res judicata. The second saving clause
of the concluding sentence also has occasioned no difficulty since it
is a clear affirmation of the statutory direction that in an in rem suit a
defendant who has not been served with in personam process nor per-
sonally served with the order of the court made pursuant to the statute
has an absolute right, upon payment of costs, to come in within one
year after entry of the final judgment, have it set aside, and plead to
the action. 24
rected, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void
judgment or order."
Strangely enough the first two paragraphs of § 473 deal, respectively, with the amend-
ment of pleadings, and continuances.
23. See infra notes 46, 82, 85.
24. Perez v. Fernandez, 220 U.S. 224 (1911).
[Vol. 55: 623
1946] FEDERAL RELIEF FROM CIVIL JUDGMENTS 633
The first saving clause of the concluding sentence is, however,
ambiguous. In reference to the scope of the "action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order, or proceeding," which is preserved without
time limit by the first saving clause, the Committee Note to Rule 60(b)
states:
"For the independent action to relieve against mistake, etc., see
Dobie, Federal Procedure, pages 760-765, compare 639; and Sim-
kins, Federal Practice, ch. CXXI (pp. 820-830) and ch. CXXII
(pp. 831-834), and compare § 214."
The wording of the saving clause referring to an "action" and the Com-
mittee Note to the Rule referring to the "independent action" might
indicate that only original actions are saved and that a merely an-
cillary proceeding such as the bill of review or coram nobis is abolished.
But the references in the Committee Note to Judge Dobie and Pro-
fessor Simkins are to discussions of bills of review, independent actions,
and incidentally writs of error coram nobis. 2 Thus, although it is not
too clear from the rule itself what the saving clause embraced, when the
Committee Note is looked to for guidance, it is reasonable to conclude
that both original and ancillary actions were intended to be preserved.-5
In arriving at the totality of relief authorized by Rule 60(b) two
sets of precedents are now apposite. First, the federal decisions con-
struing the scope of the "action" preserved by the first saving clause.
These interpret it as embracing not only independent actions in equity
but also the old ancillary proceedings: no new powers were created, no
old ones enlarged, but all former powers were retainedY The second
line of precedent is the California decisions. These are persuasive in
interpreting the first two sentences of Rule 60(b) adapted from Section
25. The direct page reference (pages 760-5) to Judge Dobie are to discu~tions of the
bill of review; the compare reference (p. 639) is to the writ of error coram nobis and the origi-
nal action in equity. The direct page references c.CXXI, pp. 820-30 and c.CXXII, pp.
831-4) to Professor Simkins are, respectively, to the bill of review and the independent
action in equity; the compare reference (§ 214) is to the wnrit of error coram nobis and
the original action in equity.
An earlier draft of the Committee Note (note to Rule 66(b) of the May, 1936, Draft)
expressly referred to the bill of review as an exaple of an independent action which was
intended to be preserved by the saving clause.
26. See3 Moonsat3274etse2.
27 Fraser v. Doing, 130 F. (2d) 617, 622,6 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 1 (App. D. C.
1942), Miller, J., stated: "... . we see no reason to conclude that Rule 60(b) . ..was in-
tended to expand the issues which may properly be urged in a bill of review, or in a com-
plaint in the nature of a bill of review. The remedy was one which had been carefully worked
out, over the years, to accomplish a certain limited purpose. It -as regarded by the rule-
makers as of sufficient importance to wrant the preservation of power in the court to use it
when the occasion required.It is obvious that it was their purpose, by means of the rezerva-
tion which they wrote into Rule 60(b), merely to recognize a power already existing; not to
create a new one, or to enlarge the old one."
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473 of the California code, 2 and the scope of the independent action in
equity to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment for fraud, accident or
mistake.2 1 Since, however, Section 473 hasno saving clause like that of
Rule 60(b), and California, having only a code background, never had
a common law and equity practice comparable to the federal ancillary
remedies, the California decisions are of limited utility concerning the
ancillary remedies, but do, nevertheless, lend support to their availa-
bility.3"
The Federal decisions. The substance of the writ of error coram nobis
has been retained under the Rules, and relief which could have been
obtained by the writ may now be secured by motion addressed to the
court which renders the judgment. In Preveden v. Hahn 31 a judgment
on the merits, based upon a stipulation signed by counsel for both
sides, was entered. More than six months later (but within a year's
time) the plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment on the ground that
his then attorney had no authority to enter into the stipulation. Over
the defendant's contention that the court lacked power to grant the
motion, relief was accorded. Judge Goddard stated that the first
saving clause
"reserves to the courts the inherent power to vacate orders or
judgments improperly entered and preserves for litigants the old
remedies of bill of review in equity and bill of error 'coram vobis' or
'coram nobis' at law. . . .Since the ancient writ of coram vobis has
been replaced by the more modern and simpler procedure of bring-
ing a motion, the question presented is whether the relief sought by
plaintiff is of the character recognized by the writ of coram vobis.
The judgment now sought to be vacated is a judgment of this court
founded upon an error not in law but an error of fact not appearing
on the face of the record nor put in issue, unknown at the time to
the court and to the party seeking relief through no fault on the
part of the court nor the aggrieved party, and is a judgment which
would not have been entered had this fact been known. Therefore,
28. Ledwith v. Storkan, 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.24, Case 2, 2 F. R. D. 539 (D. Neb.
1942) (reviewing California and incidentally other state decisions and holding that a party
will not be relieved from a default judgment on the ground of inadvertence or excusable neg-
lect of counsel where the reasons given for the attorney's neglect were unconvincing and the
party himself had not been reasonably diligent); United States for the Use of Iantor Bros.
Inc. v. Mutual Construction Corp., 7 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.24, Case 1 (E. D. Pa. 1943)
(holding that the California courts regard § 473 as remedial in nature and that the inad-
vertent failure of defendant's attorney to procure the filing in another city of an answer to a
complaint is excusable neglect where the failure was caused by the attorney's full-time par-
ticipation in another case); Fiske v. Buder, discussed infra p. 639.
29. See infra under subhead, The California Decisions.
30. Ibid.
31. 36 F. Supp. 952 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) discussed in Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b
on Other Methods of Relief from Judgment (1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 942.
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the court has the authority to entertain this motion and to grant
such relief as the situation calls for which clearly is to vacate the
judgment in question." "
The facts in C'avallo v. Agwifines 31 and McGinn v. United States 31 were
similar and like results followed on the theory, and partly on the
authority, of Judge Goddard's decision in the Preeden case. Where,
however, the effect of the saving clause -as not discussed (nor appar-
ently considered) a contra result was reached.3
32. Id. at 953.
33. 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 2,2 F. R. D. 526 (S.D. N.Y. 1942). After referring
to Preveden v. Hahn, Judge Rifldnd stated: "It may appear that violence is done to the lan-
guage of the carefully drafted rules if we read the word motion into the word action. How-
ever, the intention to preserve the old remedies for-the correction of orders and judgments
improperly made is quite clear. For the ancient writs of error coram vobis and coram nobis
and for the bill of review, the motion is the modem substitute. It should not be lightly in-
ferred, in the absence of empress language, that these well established remedies are not em-
braced in the language of the rule. Fiske v. Buder, 125 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 8th). S-;
3 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.01 et seg. The facts in the instance case are not distinguh-
able in any material aspect from those of Preveden v. Hahn, supra, which were held appro-
priate for the application of a writ of error coram vobis."
One variant fact, however, should be noted. In the Prercden case the judgment of dL-
missal was on the merits because of a stipulation which plaintiff's counsel did not have the
authority to make. In the Cavallo case the judgment of dismissal was for want of prosecu-
tion, which was due to the belief of plaintiff's counsel, induced by defendant's coun-rel, that
there was no merit in the action. As to this Judge Rifkind said: "It is clear, however, that
plaintiff did not know of a change of heart on part of his attorney, nor of his failure to bring
the case to issue nor of its dismissal. He has never consented to the abandonment of the
action. His present attorneys certify that he has a meritorious cause of action. The plaintiff
has been deprived of his day in court not through any fault of his own but by the unau-
thorized act of his attorney." Accordingly it would seem that Judge Ri! hind is correct in his
conclusion that the facts of the Prereden and Carallo cases call for the same relief.
34. 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 3, 2 F. R. D. 562 (D. Mass. 1942). This case con-
tains an e-xtended discussion by Judge Ford of the former various remedies that could be
utilized to obtain relief from judgments and decrees. And unlike Judge Rifliind (Cee note 33,
supra) he did not even regard the use of a motion as doing violence to the saing clause
which refers to an action. "As seen, the old writs of error coram nobis, or coram vobis, have
been replaced by the modem practice of proceeding by motion. New England Furniture &
Carpet Co. v. Willcutts, 55 F. (2d) page 987. Even though this is an ancillary proceeding, I
regard it as an 'action' within thelmeaning of the rule. The draftsmen of the rule cannot be
regarded as thinking of every little nicety of language and by the use of the word 'action'
foreclose an ancillary remedy that so long existed." 6 Fed. Rules Serv. at 637, 2 F. R. D. at
565.
As an additional ground for decision Judge Ford held that the action was commenced
before the Federal Rules became effective, and if Rule 60(b) did not authorize relief here, the
Federal Rules would not be applied and relief would be given by the writ of error coram nobis.
35. Reed v. South Atlantic Steamship Co., 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 1 (D. Del.
1942), decision by Circuit Judge Biggs. Even if Judge Biggs had considered the caving
clause, the decision might well have been the same, because it would seem that plaintiff's
attorney had not abandoned his client's claim as he did in the Prcrrdcn, Carillo and ,cGinn
cases (the plaintiff did not replace his counsel in the Reed case as he did in the other cases),
but that the dismissal for want of prosecution resulted from his inadvertence or neglect. If
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In the leading case, Wallace v. United States,36 Judge Frank made an
extended analysis of the saving clause and its relation to the earlier
provisions contained in Rule 60(b) and concluded that the ancillary
common law and equitable remedies were available under the rule but
that coram nobis did not lie in this instance. A taxpayer, Wallace, sued
to recover an overpayment; his action was dismissed for want of prose-
cution in 1938, although dismissal was improper under the local rules of
the trial court. Approximately two and a half years later, Wallace's
counsel moved to restore the case to the trial calendar and supported
his motion by affidavit to the effect that the dismissal had occurred
due to his inadvertence because of the press of his duties as a State
Senator. On February 14, 1941, the trial court granted the motion
and vacated the dismissal. Counsel for the United States moved to
vacate that order on the ground that it had been entered in violation of
Rule 60(b); plaintiff's counsel countered with an affidavit stating that
the government's counsel had consented to the entry of the order on
condition that Wallace would stipulate the facts so that the case could
be tried on the merits, and that subsequently such a stipulation had
been made; the court found the facts stated in the affidavit to be true.
The trial court denied the government's motion to vacate. When the
case subsequently came on for trial and the government moved for dis-
missal, on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction because its
order of February 14, 1941, was invalid, this motion was also denied;
the case was tried and judgment went for the plaintiff on the merits.
The sole basis of the government's appeal was the lack of the trial
this were true the saving clause could not be utilized to gain relief after six months, since
relief from mere inadvertence or neglect is expressly covered in the first part of Rule 60(b)
and a maximum time limit of six months is there imposed. See Wallace v. United States,
discussed infra, pp. 636-7.
For completeness, see also Shimer v. American Oil Co., 7 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.31,
Case 3, 3 F. R. D. 365 (M. D. Pa. 1944) where a motion made in 1944 to set aside a nonsult
entered in 1937 (thus nearly seven years before) was denied because of the plaintiff's laches.
Judge Watson goes on to state, however, in a short and not helpful opinion that does not
consider the saving clause: "Plaintiff's motion was not only not made within a reasonable
time, but it was not made within six months, which is the dead line under 60b of tile Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." 7 Fed. Rules Serv. at 894, 3 F. R. D. at 365. This appears to be
another case involving inadvertence or neglect on the part of plaintiff or his counsel, and
not abandonment by plaintiffs counsel, and hence properly denied. Even if it were originally
a proper case for the utilization of the substance of the writ of error coram nobis, laches
would bar relief. The Editor of the Rules Service appends the following proper note to the
Report: "While the decision of the court is correct, it is not apparent how the motion could
have been made within six months after March 30, 1937, under Rule 60b, that rule not
becoming effective until September 16, 1938." 7 Fed. Rules Serv. at 894.
36. 142 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). Accord, Sharlot v. Ford Motor Co., 9 Fed.
Rules Serv. 60b. 31, Case I (E. D. N. Y. 1945).
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court's power to make the order of February 14; Wallace conceded that
unless this order was valid his claim was barred by the statute of limi-
tations. In relation to this latter point Judge Frank said:
"We are satisfied that the record shows that the trial court en-
tered that order [Feb. 14, 1941] on the consent of government's
counsel. If the defendant were a private person, that consent would
conclude the matter and Wallace's judgment would be unassail-
able. But, assuming for the moment that, absent such consent by
defendant's counsel, the trial court could not properly enter the
vacating order (an issue we shall consider later), the question arises
whether a government counsel has implied authority (there being
no express authority) by such a consent to eliminate the defense of
the statute of limitations. We are constrained to answer in the
negative."
It then became necessary to determine the trial court's power to make
the order in question, and the following propositions were laid down.
1. That what may be done within 6 months, pursuant to the
body of the Rule, may not be done thereafter under the exception
contained in the last sentence.
2. ". . . the Rule's history indicates that 'action' was intended
also to cover whatever could have been done by a writ of error
coram nobis or coram vobis, or a bill of review, or a bill in the na-
ture of a bill of review, despite the fact that any such proceeding
was, before the new rules, not an independent 'action' but ancillary
to the main suit."
3. "The consequence of that interpretation is that pursuant to a
motion made or action begun after six months, no relief can be
granted under Rule 60(b) except that which would previously have
been proper, after the expiration of the term, in proceedings by way
of such ancillary writs or bills or in an independent suit to set aside
an order for 'extrinsic' fraud. The kind of relief Wallace sought
here could not, before the Rules, have been accorded him in such
ancillary proceedings, and he made no charge of fraud.
"The vacating order of February 14, 1941, was therefore wholly
unauthorized; since it lacked validity, the trial court had nothing
before it, and its judgment on the merits was erroneous." 1
The Fifth Circuit has also recognized in Jones v. Wattsrl that the
substance of audita querela may still be utilized. The theory of this
case was that the judgment debtor could not obtain relief, from a judg-
ment in favor of the United States, by an independent action, since
the sovereign had not consented to be sued in such a proceeding; that
audita querela was for the purpose of that rule an independent action; :
37. 142 F. (2d) at 242-5, 7 Fed. Rules Serv. at 892-3.
38. 142 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
39. This had been established by Avery v. United States, 12 Wall. 304 (U. S. 1870).
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that the substance of audita querela was, however, still available by
motion made in the original proceeding, subject only to laches. The
court did not discuss the effect of Rule 60(b); but observed that "The
Rules of Civil Procedure, which now govern, favor the use of motions
in substitution of the old remedial writs. Rule 81(b)." 1o
An historical aspect of these two ancillary remedies which might
effect a limitation of their practical utility has not been considered by
the courts. Since the writ of error coram nobis and audita querela were
utilized to give relief only from common law judgments, must a federal
court today analyze the civil action to determine whether the action
would formerly have been one at law before utilizing the substance of
the writ to grant relief? Technically it should, and if it concluded that
the action were "equitable" it would have to deny relief unless the
former equitable remedies would warrant remedial action.4 1 Apart
from resurrecting distinctions between law and equity which require
historical research when a practical consideration of the situation at
hand would give a speedy answer, the result may or may not be satis-
factory depending on whether equity would give relief.42 But the
federal cases have not discussed this general problem, and apart from
Jones v. Watts, and the cases of McGinn v. United States and Wallace v.
United States which, because they were suits against the United States,
were undoubtedly actions at law, it cannot be determined from the
reports whether the other cases were at "law" or in "equity." Because
the Federal Rules abolish the procedural distinction between law and
equity and because of the procedural need for relief in the cases where
the old common law and equitable writs afforded remedies against
40. 142 F. (2d) 575, 577 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
41. See note 27, supra.
42. Since the writ of error coram nobis was chiefly available to bring before the court
that pronounced the judgment errors in matters of fact which had not been put in issue or
passed upon and were material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding Itself
[see infra under Writ of Error Coram Nobis (or Coram Vobis)], if such a mistake of fact oc-
curred in an equitable action it would probably be subject to correction. See McGinn v.
United States supra, note 34, where Judge Ford stated: "Also, there is a likelihood that
plaintiff's motion might have been granted under the old practice in the form of an original
bill in equity. Aside from fraud, the original action could be utilized to impeach a judgment
for mistake. United States v. Beebe, 180 U. S. 343; Robb v. Vos, 155 U. S. 13; Perking v.
Hendryx, C. C., 149 F. 256." 6 Fed. Rules Serv. at 687, 2 F. R. D. at 566. Also 3 MooRn
§ 60.03. And there is authority that an original action is not necessary, but relief from ex-
trinsic mistake may be obtained by motion in the proceeding wherein the judgment is rend-
ered if the court possessed a general jurisdiction at law and in equity. Olivera v. Grace,
19 Cal. (2d) 570, 122 P. (2d) 564 (1942), subsequently discussed under the subhead The
California decisions, infra, pp. 644-53. Then too the doctrine of inherent power may be
drawn upon to accord relief. See Bucy v. Nevada Const. Co., 125 F. (2d) 213, 5 Fed. Rules
Serv. 60a.12, Case 2 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) discussed infra, pp. 640-1, If the fact involved
could properly be classified as newly discovered evidence, or as showing fraud, a bill of re.
view would accord relief. See pp. 676-7, infra.
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judgments, it would appear sound policy to apply the substance of
those writs in all civil actions.43
In Fraser v. Doing,4 4 the Court of Appeals held that the first saving
clause in Rule 60(b) preserves the remedy formerly available by a bill
of review or a bill in the nature of a bill of review, which granted relief
on the following grounds: (a) for error of law apparent on the face of
the record without further examination of matters of fact; (b) because
of new facts discovered since the decree which would materially affect
the decree and probably induce a different result; and (c) for fraud in
procuring the decree. No relief was granted in the instant case, how-
ever, as the only possible basis for relief was ground (a), which was
lacking in merit; and for the further reason that the bill of review was
premature since, at the time it was filed, a motion for a new trial could
have been made in the former proceeding. The Second Circuit in
Wallace v. United States is in accord with the theory that the saving
clause retains the substance of the old bills of review or bills in the
nature of bills of review. The Tenth Circuit is also of that opinion."
Apparently in a proper case relief may be obtained either by an original
action as in Fraser v. Doing, or by motion as in Wallace v. United States.
In Fiske v. Buder 41 extrinsic fraud was involved, and relief was ac-
corded by nwtion, and without the necessity of an independent action,
long after the six-months period had expired. This case is important
for at least two reasons: its reliance upon California decisions that
give relief by way of motion on grounds not specified in Section 473 of
the California Code; 4 and because the proceeding, in which the order
relieved from was made, was still pending the court should have had
control over such an order regardless of whether the fraud be intrinsic
or extrinsic.43
43. See 3 MooRE at 3275.
44. 130 F. (2d) 617 (App. D. C. 1942).
45. Norris v. Camp, 144 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) (applying Rule 60(b) in bank-
ruptcy by virtue of General Order 37).
46. 125 F. (2d) S41, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.S1, Case 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
47. The court pointed out that Rule 60(b) is based upon § 473 of the California Code,
that the California authorities allow a judgment to be vacated by motion after the statutory
time where the fraud is extrinsic as in this case. The order was set aside for two reacons: the
merits were with the moving party and there were no laches on his part.
48. The decision that the district court had the power to grant relief seems cound.
Because the order was made in a case still pending and involved the distribution of an un-
distributed fund that vras under the court's control, the court should have the power regard-
less of whether the fraud be intrinsic, such as perjury, or extrinsic, as here, in preventing a
defense. If Rule 60(b) is applicable to this type of order, and the theory of the Eighth Cir-
cult is to that effect, the Rule should be amended to make it clear that, co long as an action
is pending, the court does not lose control over orders made therein. Under one of the pro-
posed amendments, Rule 60(b) will expressly be made applicable to final orders only. See
infra pp. 691, 693.
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The Ninth Circuit in Bucy v. Nevada Construction Company 41 ruled
that the inherent power in a court to vacate an order or judgment was
not limited by Rule 60. The crux of the conflict among members of the
court concerned that portion of the Judicial Code providing:
"Whenever any cause shall be removed . .. and the district
court shall decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order
the same to be remanded to the State court from whence it came,
such remand shall be immediately carried into execution, and no
appeal from the decision of the district court so remanding such
cause shall be allowed." 50
The majority felt that the removal statute did not preclude the district
court from vacating a remand order when nothing had been done
toward carrying it into execution; the dissent contended that on mak-
ing the remand order the district court lost jurisdiction, whether the
order was right or wrong. Aside from this statutory problem, the
majority had to deal with the power of the court to vacate the order in
question. After relying upon the district court's rule for new trial, on
motion made within ten days for error in law, and without any refer-
ence to Rule 59, the court stated that Rule 60, the notes, and discus-
sion of the Advisory Committee and commentators supported the
theory of the inherent power of courts to correct their own errors and
that Rule 60 did not affect, interfere with, or curtail such common-law
power. 5' Admittedly, if a remand order is subject to Rule 60(b), there
would be no ground for the motion to vacate, assuming that the court
may upon its own initiative entertain the motion, for the court would
not be relieving "a party . . . from a judgment, order, or proceeding
taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect." Rule 60(b) does not authorize the court to relieve a
party from a judgment entered because of the court's mistake of law. 2
49. 125 F. (2d) 213, 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 60a.12, Case 2 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942).
50. 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1940).
51. The court cites the Advisory Committee's discussion appearing on page 185 of the
Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D. C. The commentator cited is 1 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925), pp. 375, 376. Freeman, at this point, is mainly concerned with
the proposition that during the term the court has unlimited control over its judgments and
inherent power to set them aside.
For another case referring to the inherent power, but unnecessarily so, see Preveden v.
Hahn, supra, note 31.
For cases sustaining inherent power of the appellate courts to set aside their judgments
long after term time because of fraud upon the court, see Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil
Products Co., 147 F. (2d) 259 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), cert. granted, 324 U. S. 839 (1945). See
also Art Metal Works v. Abraham & Straus, 107 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) cert. denied
308 U. S. 621 (1940) for the substantive disposition of one case which the Second Circuit re-
opened, without reported discussion, in which Judge Manton had participated and where it
was shown that he had been corruptly influenced; and see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238 (1944), discussed infra, pp. 679-681.
52. Nachod & United States Signal Co. v. Automatic Signal Corp., 32 F. Supp. 588,
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It is true that relief might have been given under the first saving clause
of Rule 60(b) by analogy to the bill of review for error of law apparent
on the record, if the action were one formerly "equitable" or if the
substance of the equitable remedies is available today in the civil ac-
tion, whether it be one formerly at law or in equity,-3 provided it is
held that Rule 60(b) applies to interlocutory orders and that relief can
be obtained from them only as provided therein. But, assuming the
removal statute has not deprived the court of jurisdiction over the case,
the Ninth Circuit appears to have been on sound ground in asserting
inherent power since the order was interlocutory and the action was
still pending before the court. If Rule 60(b) applies to interlocutory
orders it should be amended,5 4 for reasons now to be considered.
In Wallace v. United States, which considered at some length the
meaning of the saving clause and its relation to the other provisions of
Rule 60(b), Judge Frank stated:
"We need not and do not here consider a question which we dis-
cussed but left undecided in Matter of Barnett, 2 Cir., 124 F. (2d)
1005, 1011, 1012: Does Rule 60(b) preclude relief because of events
occurring after the six months where, before the new rules (see
Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U. S. 82 . . . ) relief would
have been granted by a motion made after the expiration of the
term but could not have been granted in an independent action or
pursuant to the writs or bills described above?" *5
John Simmons Company v. Grier Brothers " affirmed the complete
power of a federal court over its interlocutory orders, Mr. Justice
Pitney stating that "if an interlocutory decree be involved, a rehearing
may be sought at any time before final decree, provided due diligence
be employed and a revision be otherwise consonant with equity." "I
The prayer in this case was for a permanent injunction against unfair
competition and infringement of plaintiff's reissue patent and for an
accounting as to both matters. The injunction was granted by the
Pennsylvania district court on July 24, 1914. Upon appeal, the Third
Circuit held the reissue patent invalid, but the decree was not entered
3 Fed. Rules Serv. 60b.2, Case 1 (D. Conn. 1940). Possibly a proposed amendment eliminat-
ing "his" might warrant relief. See pp. 688, 6S6. infra.
53. For discussion as to whether the old law and equitable remedies should be available
only in "law" and "equity" suits, respectively, or be applied in all civil actions, ee supra,
pp. 638-9.
The substance of the writ of error coram nobis would not be available since the error
involved was one of law and not fact.
54. For a similar conclusion as to the order of distribution where the action is still
pending see the final discussion of Fishe v. Buder, infra, p. 642.
55. Wallace v. United States, 142 F. (2d) 240, 244, n. 14 of the opinion (C. C. A. 2d,
1944).
56. 258 U. S. 82 (1922).
57. Id. at 90-91.
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in the district court until almost a year after the mandate went down.
Subsequently, in another suit by the same plaintiff but against a differ-
ent defendant, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision holding the
reissue patent valid. After appropriate proceedings, the Pennsylvania
district court sustained a bill of review and held that its former decree,
issued pursuant to the Third Circuit's mandate, be set aside. The
Third Circuit reversed on the theory that "a change in the authorita-
tive rule of law, resulting from a decision by . . . [the Supreme) court
announced subsequent to the former decree, neither demonstrates an
'error of law apparent' upon the face of that decree nor constitutes new
matter in pais justifying a review." 18 Although agreeing with the
Third Circuit that this was a correct statement of the law governing
bills of review, the Supreme Court reversed on the following reasoning:
"The decree of July 24, 1914, although following a 'final hearing',
was not a final decree. It granted to plaintiffs a permanent injunc-
tion upon both grounds (unfair competition and patent infringe-
ment), but an accounting was necessary to bring the suit to a con-
clusion upon the merits." 6'
For the same reason the decree which the district court entered pur-
suant to the Third Circuit's mandate was not a final decree. So long
as the accounting proceeding was pending a bill of review was not
proper and the principles governing such a bill were inapplicable; the
so-called bill of review should, however, be treated as essentially a
petition for rehearing directed to an interlocutory decree; the Supreme
Court's decision in the Second Circuit case demonstrated that the
Third Circuit had erred in its disposition of this case upon the first
appeal, and the error "even though not amounting to 'error apparent,'
within the meaning of Lord Bacon's first ordinance" concerning bills of
review, "afforded ample ground for setting matters right upon a re-
hearing before final decree." 10
The principle of the Simmons case is sound: so long as the court has
jurisdiction over an action, it should have complete power over inter-
locutory orders made therein and should be able to revise them when
it is "consonant with equity" to do so. Under this principle it would be
clear that, in the removal case previously discussed,"' unless the dis-
trict'court had lost jurisdiction over the action by virtue of the removal
statute, the court could vacate its remand order. And it would seem
that in the Fiske v. Buder 62 situation the court should have equal power
over its order of distribution so long as the undistributed fund is sub-
58. Grier Bros. Co. v. Baldwin, 265 Fed. 481, 488 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1920).
59. 258 U. S. at 89.
60. Id. at 92.
61. Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co. supra. n. 49.
62. See note 46 supra.
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ject to the court's control and the action remains pending for purposes
of distribution. These cases involving interlocutory orders proceeded,
however, on the theory that Rule 60(b) was applicable to such orders,
but that, nevertheless, relief could be given because of the inherent
power of the court in one case, and because of extrinsic fraud in the
other. Support for these decisions is found in the inclusiveness of the
language of the first sentence of Rule 60(b) referring to a "judgment,
order, or proceeding," and in the California decisions construing a
similar phrase as including interlocutory orders.03
It was settled that where a final decree granting a permanent injunc-
tion has become of no use or benefit to the one whose rights were pro-
tected, or where it would be inequitable to continue it, because of the
occurrence of facts and conditions since its rendition, the decree could
be modified or vacated."4 The first saving clause of Rule 60(b) is inept
63. See note 88 infra.
64. State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 421 (U. S.
1855) (subsequent enactment by Congress of a statute authorizing a bridge over the Ohio
river at Wheeling rendered inoperative a Supreme Court decree enjoining the continuance of
the bridge and ordering its abatement as a public nuisance); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S.
600 (1923), (where defendants had been enjoined from proceeding under at attempted in-
corporation of an independent district into a consolidated school district on the ground that
there was no statute authorizing such incorporation, the subsequent enactment of a curative
statute granting such power vrarrants vacating the injunction), affg 45 S. D. 149, 186 N. W.
867 (1922); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106 (1932). By a consent decree entered
in a suit by the United States under the Sherman Act, a monopolistic combination of meat
packers was dissolved and the packers were enjoined from doing certain things, including the
wholesaling and retailing of "groceries." Years later certain of the defendants applied for a
modification eliminating the latter matter. Although holding that there had not been such
a change of events as to warrant modification, Mr. justice Cardozo stated: "We are not
doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in adaptation to changed
conditions though it was entered by consent. . . . Power to modify the decree was rLerved
by its very terms, and so from the beginning went hand in hand with its restraints. If the
reservation had been omitted, power there still would be by force of principles inherent in
the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction directed to events to
come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need. . . . The distinction is
between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts co nearly perma-
nent as to be substanlially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of
changing conduct or conditions and'are thus provisional and tentative .... The result is
all one whether the decree has been entered after litigation or by onsent .... In either
event, a court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate if s-ntisfied that
what il has been doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an instrument
of wrong."); Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 75 Neb. 85, 106 N. W. 429 (1905)
(where defendant had been enjoined from interring the dead in certain land because of pol-
luting plaintiff's wells, it was recognized that the court had the power to vacate the injunc-
tion if plaintiff had ceased using the wells, but use was found and vacation denied); RE-
STATEmEuNT, ToR-s, § 943, p. 729; 3 MOORE (Supp. 1942).
The fact that the court has erroneously applied the law, or that there is a cubZequent
judicial change in the theory of law on which the decision is based is not ground for modifica-
tion of a permanent injunction. National Popsicle Corp. v. Hughes, 32 F. Supp. 397 (N. D.
Cal. 1940) (On June 3, 1930, D was enjoined from infringing P's patent. On February 2,
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in preserving this power, but since the power is clearly rooted in prac-
tical good sense courts have continued to exercise it."6
The California decisions. As the power of the California courts over
their final judgments expired at the end of the term, unless kept alive
by motion or appropriate proceeding during the term, the state early
enacted legislation prescribing time limits in which judgments and
defaults inight be vacated. The time within which an application for
relief must be made and the grounds therefor depended upon whether
relief could be obtained only under some provision of the code or existed
independent of statute."6 Thus, the California decisions are helpful to
the extent that they show that Section 473 of the California Code
(from which Rule 60(b) was adopted) is not exclusive.
1938, the 9th Circuit, in another action between P and X, determined that some but not all
of the patent claims in the P-D suit were invalid for want of invention. D moved to dissolve
the injunction in the P-D case because of the 9th Circuit decision in the P-X suit. Held:
denied); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henneford, 199 Wash. 462, 92 P. (2d) 214 (1939) (state
supreme court subsequently changed its position in another case and upheld validity of the
state compensating tax); noted in (1939) 7 U. CH. L. REa. 180; see John Simmons Co. v.
Grier Brothers, cited supra note 56. On the other hand there is authority that a change of
judicial decision may warrant modification. Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 148 Atl. 699
(1930) (change of law by judicial decision as to what constitutes a nuisance held to warrant
modification of injunction against maintenance of a public garage).
It is clearly proper for a federal court to provide in a decree, that has prospective fea-
tures, for its modification in the event of a change in state law. Glenn v. Field Packing Co.,
290 U. S. 177 (1933) (A three-judge court permanently enjoined the imposition of a Ken-
tucky tax of ten cents per pound on oleomargerine sold within the state as violative of the
Kentucky constitution. Held, "the decree will be modified by providing that the members
of the State Tax Commission, or that Commission, may apply at any time to the court
below, by a bill or otherwise, as they may be advised, for a further order or decree, in case it
shall appear that the statute has been sustained by the state court as valid under the state
constitution, or that by reason of a change in circumstances the statute may be regarded as
impoiing a valid tax.") Id. at 179; (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 708.
65. International Railway Co. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58, 8 Fed. Rules Sere. 60b.51,
Case 3 (W. D. N. Y. 1945).
66. For the background of § 473, see 14 CAL. JUR. 1060-2; Brackett v. Banegas, 99 Cal.
623, 34 Pac. 344 (1893). ,
In Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 122 P. (2d) 564 (1942) Chief Justice Gibson stated
for a unanimous court: "In many states, including Calirornia, the general common law power
that courts had to control their own judgments during the term at which they were rendered
has been continued in the form of statutory authority. . . .Under such statutes the court
which rendered the judgment has power, in its discretion ... for a definite period of time
and upon specified grounds to open, vacate or modify its own final judgment. (CODa CIV,
PROC., sec. 473; . . ,)" Id. at 573, 122 P. (2d) at 566.
And in reference to the matter covered in the fourth and concluding paragraph of § 473
[quite similar to Rule 60(a)] on the correction of clerical mistakes and the setting aside of a
void judgment, see note 22 supra, the Chief Justice states: "Apart from statutory authority,
all courts are said to have an inherent power to correct their records, so as to make them
speak the truth, and under this inherent power courts have frequently corrected their final
judgments, when, because of clerical errors or omissions, the judgments actually rendered
were not the judgments intended to be rendered. . . . Similarly, a court has inherent power,
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Relief from judgments or orders may be summarized as follows:
1. Clerical mistakes may be corrected at any time.17 A judgment
which is void on its face may be vacated at any time.cs Also a default
judgment or order void, not on its face, but because of want of jurisdic-
tion over the person of a defendant who had at no time been present
in the proceedings may be vacated within a reasonable time, which by
analogy to Section 473a, is limited to one year.2
apart from statute, to correct its records by vacating a judgment which is void on its face,
for such a judgment is a nullity and may be ignored.
"In addition to the situations already discussed," he continued, "where courts have st
aside final judgments under statutory authority or under their inherent power to correct
their own records, there exists a well-recognized jurisdiction in equity..... Equity's juris-
diction to interfere with final judgments is based upon the absence of a fair, adversary trial
in the original action."
The history of the fourth and concluding paragraph of § 473 xs traced in the earlier
case of Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal. (2d) 563, 107 P. (2d) 36 (1940): "Prior to 1933 this particu-
lar subdivision of § 473 was in section 900a of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to justice'
courts. In that year as part of e-xtensive amendments made to the various Code sections
relating to the jurisdiction and procedure of the courts, the special sections relating to the
justices' courts were repealed and their contents incorporated in the general sections relating
to pleadings in civil actions (CODE Civ. Proc., §§ 420-475), which were at that time made
applicable to all courts. (CODE CIV. PROC., § 34.) Fear existed that unless the contents of
former section 900a were placed in some statute, courts not of record might be held to b2
without those powers. (F. E. Young Co. Inc. v. Fernstrom, 31 Cal. App. (2d) (Supp.) 763,
[79 Pac. (2d) 1117]). Thus, the 1933 amendment to section 473 added nothing to the juris-
diction of the courts with respect to setting aside their judgments or orders. Independently
of this provision a court may set aside at any time a judgment or order obtained by extrinsic
fraud. A court may set aside at any time a judgment or order void on its face. It may set
aside a default judgment or order issued without proper jurisdiction over the percon of a
defendant who at no time was before the court if motion for such relief is made within one
year. And, of course, it may set aside a judgment or order inadvertently made upon motion
within six months, under section 473. But it cannot, after time for appeal has elapz d, cat
aside a judgment or order on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, when the facts
establishing such jurisdiction were found by the court in the original proceedings, and all
adverse parties were properly served with notice and had the opportunity to present their
objections." Id. at 572, 107 P. (2d) at 41.
67. See the concluding paragraph of § 473 set out in note 22 supra; Olivera v. Grace
and Estate of Estrem both supra, note 66.
68. Ibd.
69. Estate of Estrem, 16 Cal. (2d) 563, 107 P. (2d) 36 (1940); Richert v. Benson Lumbar
Co., 139 Cal. App. 671,34 P. (2d) 840 (4th Dist. 1934) (relief denied a party although he filed
his notice one day before a year had expired following the rendition of the judgment, and
two days before the expiration of a year from its entry where the motion was actually made
more than a year later), criticized in (1935) 23 Cans. L. Rlv. 217, 213 ("the strict applica-
tion of the year provision seems very harsh where the existence of the order or judgment is
not discovered by the party against whom it has been given in time for him to make his ap-
plication. It is submitted, therefore, that the provision should be applied subject to the
qualification that the discovery be made within the period, or that the defendant have a
reasonable time after such discovery to act. The principal case, however, secms to repudiate
any such qualification, for a lapse only of a few extra days was held enough to deprive the
defendant of his remedy at law. Probably in some cases equitable relief may be had.").
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2. Relief may be had under Section 473 on motion made within a
maximum time limit of 6 months where a judgment, order, or proceed-
ing was taken against a party through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.
3. Judicial error may be remedied by motion for new trial; 70 by
motion to vacate a judgment or decree, "when based upon findings of
fact made by the court, or the special verdict of a jury" because of
"incorrect or erroneous conclusions of law not consistent with or not
supported by the findings of fact," or because the judgment or decree
is "not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict," and
to enter another and different judgment; 11 and by appeal.72 Judicial
error is not correctible under Section 473.73 But a bill of review may
be maintained notwithstanding the remedy by motion for new trial.
4. Relief may be obtained by an original action to enjoin the en-
forcement of the judgment or order, or by a motion made in the pro-
ceeding culminating in the judgment or order, at any time, subject
only to the doctrine of laches, where there was extrinsic (as distin-
guished from intrinsic) fraud, accident, or mistake.
The non-statutory ground of bill of review, cumulative to the statu-
tory remedy for a new trial, was considered at length and reaffirmed in
San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Company v. Stevinson,7 4
Section 473(a), which is utilized by analogy, provides: "When from any cause the sum-
mons in an action has not been personally served on the defendant, the court may allow,
on such terms as may be just, such defendant or his legal representatives, at any time within
one year after the rendition of any judgment in such action, to answer to the merits of the
original action." Compare the second saving clause of Rule 60(b) discussed p, 632 supra.
70. See § 657 specifying grounds for new trial; § 659 provides that a motion for a new
trial must be made "either before the entry of judgment or within ten (10) days after re-
ceiving written notice of the entry of the judgment"; this time "shall not be extended by
order or stipulation."
71. Section 663. Service of a notice of intention to move under § 663 must be made
within ten days after notice of the entry of judgment; the time designated for the making of
the motion must not be more than sixty days from the time of the service of the notice.
Section 663a.
72. Appealable judgments and orders are enumerated in § 963. An appeal may be
taken within sixty days from the entry of said judgment or order. "If proceedings on mo-
tion for a new trial are pending, the time for appeal from the judgment shall not expire until
thirty days after entry in the trial court of the order determining such motion for a new trial,
or other termination in the trial court of the proceedings upon such motion." Section 939.
73. Glougie v. Glougie, 174 Cal. 126, 162 Pac. 118 (1916).
"Some errors, however, ... seem to have been treated as proper grounds for vacating
the judgment, probably because regarded as irregularity and inadvertence, as in case of a
judgment rendered without findings, or of a judgment on a default prematurely entered, or
which had been waived." 14 CAL. JUR. 1022.
74. 175 Cal. 607, 166 Pac. 338 (1917), critically noted in (1918) 6 CALIr. L. RaV. 154
on the ground that it divides a united procedure into "law" and "equity" actions and gives
relief only in the latter cases. The commentator overlooks the possibility of extending such
equitable relief to all actions under the united procedure. See p. 638-9 supra.
[Vol. 55: 623
1946] FEDERAL RELIEF FROM CIVIL JUDGMENTS 647
two judges dissenting from the principle. The basis for the bill of re-
view was newly discovered evidence, and while the bill was filed within
a relatively short time after the discovery of the evidence (about four
and one-half months), the plaintiff was adjudged guilty of laches in
failing for 12 years after the commencement of an action involving
riparian rights to examine the land records, which would have disclosed
a deed by the defendant conveying such rights to a third party-the
newly discovered evidence. The court's declared reason for holding
that a bill of review in equity will lie in California is that "The superior
courts have complete and full jurisdiction of all cases in equity-the
same jurisdiction as that possessed and administered by the high court
of Chancery." 7- A very practical reason which the court did not stress
75. 175 Cal at 611, 166 Pac. at 340. The court continued in the San Joeauin case as
follows:
"It is true, of course, that the legislature may prescribe the mode of procedure in the
exercise of that jurisdiction, and if a different form of action or procedure is provided a- a
substitute for the former bill in equity, the method provided by the statute must be followed.
But the proceeding for a new trial at common law existed concurrently with the remedy in
equity for a new trial. One is not a substitute for the other. Such bills have been frequently
entertained in this state and treated as a proper subject of equity jurisdiction. Bucl:elew v.
Chipman, 5 Cal. 399; Mulford N% Cohn, 18 Cal. 46; Butler v. Vassault, 40 Cal. 74; Allen v.
Currey, 41 Cal. 318. The reason for the rarity of such actions is easily dicernible from the
decision in Mulford v. Cohn. It is perhaps surrounded by greater difflculties in the way of
success than any other action kmown to the law or equity. Upon this subject the court there
says:
'It must be shown distinctly in such a bill that the facts are of controlling force;
that they were not known to the defendants at the time of the trial; that the defend-
ants used all proper diligence to prepare their case for trial, and to procure the evi-
dence, and that they were unable, without fault or negligence on their part, to pro-
cure it; that the testimony is now within their control, and that they will be able to
procure it on another trial. The bill should state particularly the facts to be proved,
the names of the witnesses, and show the bearing and relevancy of the propozed
proofs. It should also show when and how the facts discovered came to the kmowl-
edge of the plaintiffs, and why no motion for new trial was made in the court tr)ing
the case, and before the lapse of the term.'
"It is also necessary as a matter of course, that all these facts should be fully proven in
order to establish the right to such relief. Perhaps in the matter of diligence there is no
method of procedure in which so high a standard is required, both in the pleading and the
proof, to authorize the relief." Ibid.
The court pointed out that "Bills of review for a new trial are of two hinds; a reviev for
errors appearing on the face of the record, and a review becaue of newly discovered evidence.
With respect to a review for errors on the face of the record, it %%as settled in equity that they
would not be entertained after the time allowed by the statute for an appeal had expired.
. . . Vith respect to bills of review for newly discovered evidence, the rule is not the came.
There are decisions holding that such a bill must be instituted within the time allowed for an
appeal but that the time begins to run only upon the discovery of the new evidence. The
present case was begun within that period after the discovery. But with this exception the
rule is that the time within which such an action must be begun is to be determined within
the sound discretion of the court, and must not be an unreasonable period and wilt depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case." Id., at 613, 166 Pac. at 341.
Chief Justice Angellotti, with whom Justice Henshaw concurred, agreed that the judg-
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is that the statutory time for moving for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence (10 days) 11 is so short as to be useless.
In the above situation the ancillary equitable remedies for relief
from a judgment or order were held not to be superseded by the code.
It has also long been established that the original jurisdiction of chan-
cery to relieve a party from a judgment or order, the fruit of certain
types of fraud, accident or mistake, has not been impaired by Section
473, The California courts have verbally followed the federal doctrine
of United States v. Throckmorton 17 that the fraud, accident or mistake
ment dismissing the bill of review was proper but dissented from the theory of the majority
on the ground that the matter of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was
covered, to the exclusion of all other remedies, by the statute. "This court has already held
that a bill of review will not lie for errors appearing on the face of the record (the other
ground under the old equity practice), the statute providing an appeal as the exclusive
remedy. (See San Francisco Say. & Loan Soc. v. Thompson, 34 Cal. 76, 78.) The same is
true on principle as to a bill of review on the ground of newly discovered evidence." 175 Cal.
at 614, 166 Pac. at 341.
The doctrine of the San Joaquin case has been applied in another code state. DeBaca v.
Sais, 44 N. Mex. 105, 99 P. (2d) 106 (1940) (The district court had jurisdiction of bill of
review to correct or amend its judgment foreclosing mortgage by including omitted tract
described in mortgage as part of property ordered sold for satisfaction of judgment, though
such bill was filed over five months after entry of judgment and was not authorized by
statute.); State ex rel. Brady v. Frenger, 44 N. Mex. 386, 103 P. (2d) 115 (1940) (A bill of
review is the correct remedy to secure a review of a decree on the ground of evidence dis-
covered too late to be available at the original hearing or on a motion for new trial provided
the strict rules governing such procedure would otherwise authorize it. "The district courts
of this state have complete and full jurisdiction in all equity cases, including all equity pro-
cedure not changed by statute, and the statutory proceeding for a new trial is not a substi-
tute for bills of review." 44 N. Mex. at 388, 103 P. (2d) at 116).
76. See §§ 657, 659 referred to in note 70 supra.
77. 98 U. S. 61 (1878). The bill in equity to annul a decree establishing land title in
certain persons was brought more than twenty years after the rendition of the decree sought
to be annulled. The fraud relied upon was a false deed-intrinsic fraud in that the validity
of that deed was one of the crucial issues in the earlier suit. After referring to the sound
principle of res judicata that puts an end to litigation the Court, through Mr. Justice Miller,
reviewed the means whereby judgments may be attacked:
"If the court has been mistaken in the law, there is a remedy by writ of error. If
the jury has been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by motion for new trial. If
there has been evidence discovered since the trial, a motion for a new trial will give
appropriate relief. But all these are parts of the same proceeding, relief is given in
the same suit, and the party is not vexed by another suit for the same matter. So
in a suit in chancery, on proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the injury com-
plained of is an erroneous decision, an appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to
correct the error. If new evidence is discovered after the decree has become final,
a bill of review on that ground may be filed within the rules prescribed by law on
that subject. Here, again, these proceedings are all part of the same suit, and the
rule framed for the repose of society is not violated.
"But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason
of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary
trial or decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been pre-
vented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
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must be extrinsic to afford independent equitable relief. In spite of
the fact that some federal courts have interpreted their doctrine as
authorizing independent equitable relief whether the matter be ex-
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of compromise; or
where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by
the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney
regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side,-the:2,
and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and a fair
hearing. (citing authority) ...
"In all these cases, and many others which have been en mnined, relief has been
granted, on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party sce!:-
ing relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from pre-
senting all of his case to the court.
"... We think these decisions establish the doctrine on which we decide the
present case; namely, that the acts for which a court of equity will on account of
fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties, rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds, etrinsie or collateral,
to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the
decree was rendered.
"That the mischief of retrying every case in which the judgment or decree ren-
dered on false testimony, given by perjured witnesses, or on contracts or documents
whose genuineness or validity was in issue, and which are afterwards ascertained
to be forged or fraudulent, would be greater, by reason of the endless nature of the
strife, than any compensation arising from doing justice in individual cases.
"The case before us comes within this principle. The genuineness and validity
of the concession from Micheltorena produced by complainant was the single ques-
tion pending before the board of commissioners and the District Court for four
years. It was the thing, and the only thing, that was controverted, and it was eczen-
tial to the decree. To overrule the demurrer to this bill would be to retry, twenty
years after the decision of these tribunals, the very matter which they tried, on the
ground of fraud in the document on which the decree was made. If we can do this
now, some other court may be called on twenty years hence to retry the same mat-
ter on another allegation of fraudulent combination in this suit to defeat the ends
of justice; and so the number of suits would be without limit and the litigation end-
less about the single question of the validity of this document." Id. at 65, 63.
78. Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129,25 Pac. 970,27 Pac. 537 (1S91) (following Unied Staesv.
Throckrorrlon it was held that an independent suit in equity to annul a decree would not lie
because the prevailing party obtained it by bribing a witness to swear falsely); Steen v.
March, 132 Cal. 616, 64 Pac. 994 (1901) (perjury is intrinsic fraud); Frec-no Estate Co. v.
Fiske, 172 Cal. 583, 157 Pac. 1127 (1916) (same); La Salle v. Peterson, 220 Cal. 739, 32 P.
(2d) 612 (1934) ("and the fact that the bringing of the action and the introduction of the
perjured evidence may have resulted from conspiracy does not change it from intrinsic to
extrinsic fraud"); Bake v. O'Riordan, 65 Cal. 368,4 Pac. 232 (1884) (A decree of distribution
to the defendant had been obtained by the consent of an attorney, who, fraudulently and
without authority, appeared for Bake, who was entitled as husband of the decedent. Held,
equitable relief could be given because of the extrinsic fraud practiced upon the court and
the losing party.); Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282 (1902) (held there vas equitable
power to give relief from a decree of distribution induced by the fraud of the defendants,
coupled with the mistake or ignorance of the plaintiff, where the ignorance was also the
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trinsic or intrinsic,79 the California courts have continued to make this
result of the fraud); Flood v. Templeton, 152 Cal. 148, 92 Pac. 78 (1907) (inducement of one
to refrain from presenting a proper defense to a foreclosure of a mortgage suit by virtue of
the promises and agreement of the plaintiff therein to devise and bequeath the property
upon his death to the defendant was, as to the defendant, extrinsic fraud which prevented a
presentation at the trial of defendant's meritorious defense); Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477,
89 Pac. 317 (1907) (Leading case on extrinsic mistake. Testator declared that, if his estate
was worth more than $250,000, the wife of his son and the husbands of his two daughters
should each receive ten thousand dollars. The estate was worth more than the sum specified,
and on the reading of the will the word "ten" was by mistake read as "two", for which it
could easily be taken. Testator's three children were appointed his personal representatives,
and had copies of the will made for each legatee, in which the mistake was continued. The
subsequent proceedings in the estate were conducted by the use of the copies, and plaintiff,
the wife of the son, was induced by the personal representatives to execute a receipt in full of
her legacy on the payment to her of $2,000, and such personal representatives thereafter
obtained a decree of distribution, at which plaintiff did not appear and was not represented,
which fixed her interest in the estate as $2,000. Held, that as there had never been any real
contest with reference to the amount of plaintiff's legacy, the mistake was extrinsic and an
independent suit to set aside the decree would lie within the principle of United States v.
Throckmorton.); Soule v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 495, 89 Pac. 324 (1907) (similar case and result,
although plaintiff had looked at the will and had seen a newspaper account that the legacy
was $10,000); Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 122 P. (2d) 564 (1942) (Rust and her
daughter, Haas, held certain property as joint tenants. Subsequently Grace, as administra-
trix of the Haas estate, sued Rust to reform the joint tenancy deed and obtain an adjudica-
tion that the property was owned in fee simple by Haas; after personal service was made
upon Rust, Grace took a default judgment on August 14, 1936. At that time the defendant
Rust was in fact mentally incompetent and known to be so by Grace, but was not judicially
declared incompetent until nearly two years later. The now plaintiff, Olivera, did not dis-
cover the default judgment until January 4, 1939, after Rust's death and after Olivera's ap-
pointment as administratrix of the Rust estate. Shortly thereafter Olivera, as administra-
trix, sued to set aside the default judgment. Held, complaint stated a cause of action. While
it was contended that the now defendant Grace was guilty of extrinsic fraud in taking a
default judgment against her grandmother at a time when she knew that the latter was in
fact incompetent, the court preferred to put its decision on the ground of extrinsic mistake.
"Where an adversary hearing has in fact been held, a cause of action for relief in equity can
be stated upon the ground that extrinsic fraud prevented a fair adversary proceeding, In
cases such as the one here presented, however, where there has been no adversary proceeding
at all, the right of the incompetent defendant to equitable relief may be established if the
plaintiff's ignorance of defendant's legal disability prevented a true adversary hearing as
well as where the plaintiff's fraud prevented such a hearing, Courts have granted such relief
on behalf of incompetent defendants aside from the element of fraud on the part of the plain-
tiff if, in fact, no adversary hearing was held. . . Some courts, it is true, have referred to
this situation as 'constructive fraud' which entitles the incompetent defendant against whom
a default judgment has been taken to relief in equity. . . We think it more accurate,
however, to characterize such a situation as extrinsic mistake, which is a recognized ground
for the intervention of equity where the mistake has prevented a fair adversary hearing."
Id. at 577); Clavey v. Loney, 80 Cal. App. 20, 251 Pac. 232 (1926) (the fact that by mis-
take an entire interest in property was by decree of distribution distributed to one entitled
to only a fractional interest therein, would not, in the absence of extrinsic fraud, warrant
equitable relief); (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 156; (1934) 23 CALIF. L. Rv. 79; (1943) 31 CALIF.
L. REv. 600.
79. See Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F. (2d) 949, 126 A. L. R. 386 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939)
(a court of equity will, even after two years, vacate its decree authorizing a receiver to com-
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nebulous distinction, although recent cases have given relief in situa-
tions bordering closely upon, if not involving only, intrinsic matter."0
It will be recalled that while Section 473 authorizes relief on the
ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, it is
entirely silent concerning fraud."' It is not surprising, however, to find
promise a claim against another where such decree is shown to have been obtained by perjury
as to the debtor's ability to pay), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 624 (1940). The PuN[ichr case notes
the conflict between United Stales v. Throckmorlon and the later decision of 'Marc-hall v.
Holmes, 141 U. S. 589 (1891) and the divergent holdings of the lower federal courts. See
3 MlooE, at 3268-9; (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 268 ("The Supreme Court of the United States,
to show its utter impartiality, has ruled both ways, and left the spectacle of two cases, one of
which holds that false evidence is a ground for reversal, the other that it is not, both of which
have been followed, and neither of which has ever been overruled.... Since the courts are
at liberty to cite either line of authorities, and do as suits their convenience, the only po-sible
answer in spite of repeated assertions that the federal rule is clear, is that there is no federal
rule at all. And there will be none until one or the other of the conflicting decisions is over-
ruled." Id. at 269). The Publicker case concludes: "In our judgment, and if the case arses,
the harsh rule of United States v. Throckmorton . . . will be modified in accordance with
the more salutary doctrine of Marshall v. Holmes .... We believe truth is more important
than the trouble it takes to get it." 106 F. (2d) at 952.
80. Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, 23 P. (2d) 758 (1933) (Where it was held in an
action by the sole heir of the testator that, although the deliberate falsehood made by the
defendant beneficiary to the plaintiff for the purpose of concealing her real identity was the
same specie of fraud as that practiced upon the testator and was necessary to prevent the
entire structure of deceit from collapsing, the alleged fraud was extrinsic in that it was prac-
iced upon the plaintiff with the purpose of preventing him from presenting to the court the
actual facts which, if established, would vitiate the will.); Stenderup v. Broadway State
Bank, 219 Cal. 593, 28 P. (2d) 14 (1933) (Defendant's conduct in fraudulently refusing to
furnish plaintiff with any information as to collections, prior to the accounting in which de-
fendant's witnesses fraudulently testified to the amount of the collections, was held to be
extrinsic fraud. This case is criticized in (1934) 23 C,%LiF. L. Rnv. 79 on the ground that the
plaintiff had ample opportunity to cross-examine and produce other witnesses and that the
court did not base its decision upon the doctrine, for which there is ample authority, that
concealment by a trustee amounts to extrinsic fraud.); Hallett v. Slaughter, 22 Cal. (2d)
552, 140 Pac. 3 (1943), criticized in (1943) 31 C.uiF. L. RE,. 600, also noted in (1943)
42 'Mc. L. REv. 532 (Where both the original and the copy of the present plaintiff's an-
swer in a suit against her on an account for medical services were apparently lost in the
mails, and both a default and then a judgment by default were entered against her of which
she had no knowledge until her right for relief against the default was barred under § 473 by
lapse of time, it was held that the plaintiff was prevented by extrinsic accident and mistake
of fact from presenting her defense. Since the now defendants owed the present plaintiff no
duty to enter the default judgment immediately after the entry of default, it can be seea
that the court seizes upon an inconsequential factor to take the case out of the intrinsic acci-
dent and mistake category. Were it not for the fact that § 473 applies to interlocutory orders
as well as to final judgments the case would have been easy, since plaintiff initiated her action
to vacate the default judgment within a short time after its entry. But accident and mistake
may, of course, not come to light until some time after the entry of a final judgment.); Bartell
v. Johnson, 60 Cal. App. (2d), 140 P. (2d) 878 (1943) (Where the now plaintiff's attorney
wrote him that a personal injury action had been closed in his favor but subsequently the
now defendant instituted another suit on the same cause of action and a default judgment
was entered against the now plaintiff, the complaint was held to state a good cause of action
within the rule of the HaUelt case, supra.)
81. See note 22 supra and text accompanying.
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that the section has been construed to cover relief from judgments or
orders taken against a party through fraud,82 for at least two reasons:
the code provision is remedial and should, therefore, be liberally con-
strued; "3 and, as we have seen, independent equitable relief is not given
for intrinsic, but only for extrinsic, fraud. The two remedies-the
remedy afforded by Section 473, and the independent equitable rem-
edy-appear distinct and cumulative.8 4 The fact that a party applies
for and is denied relief under Section 473 is not in itself a bar to equita-
ble relief.8 5 The basis for this latter relief is found in the constitutional
grant to those courts of "original jurisdiction in all cases in equity;"
and while the legislature may change the practice or procedure, the
82. In re Yoder, 199 Cal. 699, 251 Pac. 205 (1926); Difani v. Riverside County Oil Co.,
201 Cal. 210, 256 Pac. 210 (1927); Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477, 89. Pac. 317 (1907) (provi-
sion in § 473 for relief for a judgment taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect "could undoubtedly also include mistake superinduced by the
fraud of another party"); In re Johnson, 7 Cal. App. 436, 94 Pac. 592 (1908) ("In applica-
tions for relief under section 473 . . . no distinction is to be made between extrinsic or other
fraud. Fraud or its equivalent, whether upon the court or a party or one so situated as to be
held in law an adversary, is sufficient to warrant relief."); Tomb v. Tomb, 120 Cal. App.
438, 7 P. (2d) 1104 (1932) ("If the fraud is intrinsic and the time for appeal has expired, then
the party seeking relief from such intrinsic fraud must, under the provisions of § 473 . . .
make application for such relief within six months after judgment. But if the fraud is ex-
trinsic this limitation does not apply.").
83. See Melte v. Reynolds, 129 Cal. 308, 61 Pac. 932 (1900); Nicoll v. Weldon, 130 Cal.
666, 63 Pac. 63 (1900); Waybright v. Anderson, 200 Cal. 374, 253 Pac. 148 (1927); In re
Mercereau, 126 Cal. App. 590, 14 P. (2d) 1019 (1932).
84. Baker v. O'Riordan, 65 Cal. 368, 4 Pac. 232 (1884); Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477,
89 Pac. 317 (1907); Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 122 P. (2d) 564, 140 A. L. R. 1328
(1942).
85. Estudillo v. Security L. & T. Co., 149 Cal. 556, 562-3, 87 Pac. 19, 22-3 (1906)
(". .. the question presented for decision is whether a party against whom a judgment ex-
cessive in amount has been entered upon a fraudulent and collusive agreement between his
attorney and the opposing party can maintain a separate suit in equity to vacate such judg-
ment, or enjoin its enforcement when it appears that he had notice of its entry and the fraud
in its procurement in ample time to have moved for relief under section 473. . . . In sup-
port of a motion he is limited to ex parte affidavits of voluntary witnesses unless the court in
its discretion permits a wider latitude. In a separate suit he may bring unwilling witnesses
into court by subpoena, and he may take their depositions. The remedy is ampler and more
efficacious, and the case is one which demands the amplest and most efficacious remedy. My
conclusion is that the plaintiffs had the right to maintain this suit, notwithstanding they
knew of the frauds alleged in ample time to have moved upon that ground. But it is objected
that they did move, and that their right to have the judgment vacated is res judicata. It
does not, however, appear from this complaint that they moved upon the ground of the
fraud here alleged, and the report of our decision on the appeal from the order denying the
motion shows that it was made upon the ground of want of authority in their attorney to
stipulate . . . in such a case as this the correct practice would be to move promptly under
section 473 . . . and, if defeated in that proceeding, to commence a separate action for
relief upon the ground of the plaintiff's fraud-a practice to be commended as convenient
and expeditious in case the motion should be granted, and as affording the injured party all
the advantages of a regular trial of the issue of fraud if the more summary proceeding proved
ineffectual."); Wilson v. Wilson, 55 Cal. App. (2d) 421, 130 P. (2d) 782 (1943).
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mere method by which the jurisdiction is exercised, it cannot take
away the jurisdiction entirely, nor substantially impair it.P In addi-
tion to invoking this independent equitable jurisdiction by a separate
action, "where the court that rendered the judgment possesses a general
jurisdiction in law and in equity, the jurisdiction of equity may be
invoked by means of a motion addressed to that court." 1
From the California decisions it is reasonable to construe Rule 60(b)
as follows:
1. The Rule applies to both interlocutory and final orders and judg-
ments33
2. Even without the first saving clause, and a fortiori with it, Rule
60(b) provides a cumulative remedy and does not impair any ancillary
or independent jurisdiction of the federal courts to relieve a party from
a judgment or order, and hence such proceedings as were available in
the federal courts as audita querela, writs of error coram nobis, bills of
review, and independent actions in equity are still available.P
3. Independent equitable relief may be obtained, in addition to an
original action, by a motion addressed to the court in which the judg-
ment or order was rendered."0 Ancillary proceedings must, of course, be
brought in that court.
AN APPRASAL OF THE ScoPE oF RULE 60 (b) As Now INTERPRETED
In light of the interpretation placed upon the first saving clause of
Rule 60(b) by the federal decisions, as well as the supporting inter-
pretation generally afforded by the California decisions, a review of
the nature and scope of the independent action in equity and the
ancillary and equitable remedies is necessary for a complete under-
standing of the Rule.
The Independent Action in Equity. The nature of the independent
86. Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477,484, 89 Pac. 317,320 (1907) (it would be unconstitu-
tional to construe that section of the code which provides that distributive decrees in probate
shall be "conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees, or devisees, subject only to be reverced,
set aside, or modified on appeal" as depriving the courts of their equitable power to give
relief from judgments and orders).
87. Oliverav. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 576, 122 P. (2d) 564, 563 (1942) ("the tatement
in Tinn v. U. S. District Attorney, 148 Cal. 773, 84 P. 152, to the effect that equity jurkic.-
tion can be invoked only by means of an independent action, and not upon motion, is no
longer an accurate statement of the law."); McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222,
237 Pac. 42 (1925); Chiarodit v. Chiarodit, 218 Cal. 147, 21 P. (2d) 562 (1933); King v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 501, 56 P. (2d) 268 (1936).
88. The California courts construe their § 473 as applicable to both interlocutory and
final orders. While most of the decisions heretofore discuszed dealt with relief from final
orders, the following deal with interlocutory orders: Hallett v. Slaughter, cited supra note cl)
(entry of default); Chiarodit v. Chiarodit, cited supra note 87 (interlocutory divorce decree);
Holtum v. Grief, 144 Cal. 521, 78 Pac. 11 (1904) (order granting new trial on condition).
89. See San Joaquin case, cited supra note 74.
90. See note 87, supra.
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action is such that a court of equity may restrain not only the enforce-
ment of equitable decrees but also judgments at law; and the decree
or judgment need not have been rendered by the court whose equitable
jurisdiction is invoked. Thus a federal court, in a proper case, could
enjoin the enforcement not only of a federal judgment, but of a judg-
ment or decree of a state tribunal." This latter principle has been
carried to the point of sustaining jurisdiction to relieve against a
divorce decree, although the federal courts have no original jurisdic-
tion over divorce proceedings.12 Formerly it was well settled that
28 U. S. C. § 379, generally forbidding the use of a federal injunction
"to stay proceedings in any court of a, State," did not prevent federal
courts "from depriving a party by means of an injunction, of the benefit
of a judgment obtained in a state court in circumstances where its
enforcement will be contrary to recognized principles of equity and
the standards of good conscience. 3 A reasonable view was that by
entertaining such actions a court is not interfering with the processes
of another court and barring the latter's judgment, but is merely
acting upon the holder of the judgment who is within its jurisdiction;
the bill to impeach or enjoin does not operate to review, undo or reverse
the decree or judgment but merely seeks to deny the other party of
the fruits thereof.
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Company94 casts doubt upon the
power of a federal court to relieve from state judgments. While this
case only held that a federal court could not enjoin relitigation in a
state court of matter adjudged in a federal court, the majority opinion,
nevertheless, expressed doubt as to the validity of cases authorizing a
federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a state judgment." Yet, the
Second Circuit upheld the power in a later case." This subject involves
a matter with which the Committee is powerless to deal by Rule, and
91. 3 MooRE, § 60.03.
92. McNeil v. McNeil, 78 Fed. 834 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1897).
93. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 183 (1920). See also Marshall v.
Holmes, 141 U. S. 589 (1891); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S. 115 (1915); Atchison
T. & S. F. R. R. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924). But where the state action was still pending,
only an interlocutory judgment having been entered, the federal court could not enjoin the
state proceeding. Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358 (1922).
94. 314 U. S. 118 (1941).
95. In reference to the cases cited in note 93 supra, Justice Frankfurter in the Toucey
case at 136-7 commented: "The foundation of these cases is very doubtful. However, we
need not undertake to re-examine them here since, in any event, they do not govern the
cases at bar."
96. See Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), Note (1945)
54 YALE L. J. 687 (where a state court had dismissed a petition for damages for defendant's
breaches of duty as a testamentary trustee and duress in forcing plaintiff to consent to a
judgment as such trustee, the court held without discussion of the Toucey case that the fed-
eral courts may exercise their equity powers to set aside, enjoin enforcement of, or ignore a
state court's judgment obtained by fraud).
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the fate of a federal action to enjoin the enforcement of a state judg-
ment must be left to judicial decisions or legislative action.
If the Toucey case has not altered the federal rule, the controlling
principle of federal jurisdiction is: an action to enjoin a state court
judgment may be brought originally in a federal court,", or removed to
it if within the removal statutes, 3 because of diversity of citizenship
or alienage,3 or because of a general federal question if the enforcement
of the state judgment would deprive the plaintiff of property without
due process.' The principles of equitable jurisdiction stem from such
circumstances "as would authorize relief by the Federal court, if the
judgment had been rendered by it and not by a state court;" 1' and
the federal remedy may be invoked without first pursuing the remedy
provided by state procedure.1 2
The principles of the Toucey case do not, of course, restrict in any
way the power of a federal court to give relief from a federal judgment.
But if original federal jurisdiction is necessary for an independent ac-
tion to enjoin a federal judgment, complications may arise. When the
original judgment was entered in an action where the jurisdiction was
based upon diversity or alienage, then in most, but not necessarily all,
cases the same diversity or alienage would exist in the subsequent
action by the judgment debtor to enjoin the judgment creditor. The
jurisdictional amount might, however, cause trouble. If in the original
action the plaintiff's claim exceeds $3,000 but the recovery is for less
than this amount, it could hardly be said that, in the subsequent action
to enjoin, the amount in controversy satisfied the jurisdictional mini-
mum. Similar, and perhaps more serious, jurisdictional problems
would be encountered where the original judgment was entered in an
action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States, since the federal question supporting jurisdiction of the first
action would not be present in the subsequent action based upon
fraud, accident, or mistake, as the case may be. Realization of these
practical difficulties has resulted in supporting the equitable action
upon principles of ancillary jurisdiction. It is at least clear that where
97. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, cited supra note 93 (diversity); Simon v. Southern
Ry., cited supra note 93 (diversity).
98. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589 (1891) (removal by the p!oamliff because of di-
versity at a time when the removal statutes permitted a plaintiff to remove). If however
the proceeding in the state court is not of an original and independent character, but is
ancillary-being equivalent in common-law practice to a writ of error coram nobis-the
proceeding is supplementary and not removable. Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80 (1878).
99. Marshall v. Holmes, cited supra note 98.
100. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156 (1932) (as where the judgment vas
entered without notice).
101. Marshall v. Holmes, cited supra note 98.
102. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, cited supra note 100; Simon v. Southern Ry.,
cited supra note 93; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. v. Wells, cited supra note 93.
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the equitable action is brought in the same federal court which ren-
dered the jubgment under attack, the equitable action may be sup-
ported as ancillary. In Pacific Railroad of Missouri v. Missouri Pacific
Railway "03 the court held and stated:
"On the question of jurisdiction the suit may be regarded as ancil-
lary to the Ketchem suit, so that the relief asked may be granted
by the court which made the decree in that suit, without regard to
the citizenship of the present parties, though partaking so far of the
nature of an original suit as to be subject to the rules in regard to
the service of process which are laid down by Mr. Justice Miller in
Pacific Railroad v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 1 McCrary, 647,
3 Fed. 772. The bill, though an original bill in the chancery sense
of the word, is a continuation of the former suit, on the question of
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court." 104
Since the jurisdiction is ancillary, the venue of the independent action
may be properly laid in the court which had jurisdiction of the original
action."0 5 The principles of service of process stated by Mr. Justice
Miller in Pacific Railroad v. Missouri Pacific Railway 'oI which involved
a suit to set aside a decree and sale of the Missouri Pacific made upon
foreclosure, were: after application to the court setting forth the cir-
cumstances which render service on the attorney of a person before
the court in the former suit proper, and a court order directing that
such service be made, then such service, when made, shall answer as a
substitute for actual service on the party so represented by the attor-
ney; but, as to persons who were not parties to the original action,
process can not be served upon them without the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the court. This case has been interpreted as not limiting the
right to serve process, beyond the territorial limits of the court, upon
those who were parties to the original action or are in privity with such
parties,' or, as the Sixth Circuit has stated, a party to the original
suit is already in court for all ancillary proceedings.'
103. 111 U. S. 505 (1884).
104. Id. at 522. Accord: Johnson v. Christian, 125 U. S. 642 (1888); Carey v. Houston &
Texas Ry., 16 1 U. S. 115 (1896); Dickey v. Turner, 49 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931)
(bill to enjoin enforcement of defendant's law judgment in same court because of fraudulent
assignment to prevent offset held ancillary to original suit, making jurisdiction independent
of amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship).
105. Dickey v. Turner, 49 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); see also Lesnik v. Public
Industrials Corp., 144 F. (2d) 968, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 13h.23, Case I (C. C. A. 2d, 1944)
(where a defendant pleaded a compulsory counterclaim against plaintiff and additional
parties, the counterclaim was ancillary and no separate satisfaction of the venue require-
ments was necessary as to such additional parties).
106. 3 Fed. 772 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1880).
107. O'Connor v. O'Connor, 146 Fed. 994 (C. C. W. D. Tex. 1906). Accord: Hanna v.
Brictson Mfg. Co., 62 F. (2d) 139, 149 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933); and see Merriam v. Saalfield,
241 U. S. 22, 29 (1916); Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Co., 284 U. S. 448, 454-5 (1932).
L 108. Dickey v. Turner, 49 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). See also Minnesota Co. v.
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If the independent action in equity is not brought in the federal
court which rendered the original judgment, but in another federal
court it is quite doubtful if such action can be supported on ancillary
principles."3 Even if jurisdiction exists for such an action, the position
has been taken that the second federal court "should refuse to exercise
its jurisdiction to interfere with the operation of a decree of another
federal court." 110
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the so-called in-
dependent action in equity in a federal court to enjoin the enforcement
of a federal judgment is not, as a practical matter, very dissimilar in
its procedural aspects from the ancillary common-law and equitable
remedies of audita querela, coram nobis and bill of review, which may
now be instituted by motion. The principle governing the forum for
the independent action approaches very closely the principle governing
the forum for the ancillary remedies, to wit, the court which rendered
the judgment under attack. WAhere the independent action is brought
in the court which rendered the original judgment it is supported for
purposes of jurisdiction and venue on the ground of ancillary jurisdic-
tion: a continuation of the original action for jurisdictional purposes.
Service of process in the independent action does not differ radically
from the service of a motion invoking the ancillary remedies. The
motion for ancillary relief must state grounds therefor in much the
same manner that the complaint must state a basis for relief in the
independent action."' By virtue of Rule 43(e) the same type of hear-
ing may be had on the motion as in the independent action; and the
same principles of appeal would apply in each situation.
Any essential difference between the independent action and the
St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 633 (U. S. 1864) where Mr. justice Miller stated: "But we think
that the question is not whether the proceeding is supplemental and ancillary or is inde-
pendent and original, in the sense of the rules of equity pleading; but whether it is supple-
mental and ancillary or is to be considered entirely new and original, in the cense which this
court has sanctioned with reference to the line which divides the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts from that of the State courts. No one, for instance, would hesitate to cay that, ac-
cording to the English chancery practice, a bill to enjoin a judgment at law, is an original bill
in the chancery sense of the word. Yet this court has decided many times, that when a bill is
filed in the Circuit Court, to enjoin a judgment of that court, it is not to ba considered as an
original bill, but as a continuation of the proceeding at law; so much so, that t7 court -ill
proceed in the injunction suit without actual service of subpoena on the defendant, and though he
be a citizen of another State, a party to the judgment at law." (emphasis added.)
109. Raphaelv. Trask, 194 U. S. 272 (1904); Winter v. Svinburne, S Fed. 49 (C. C. E. D.
Wis. 1881); 1 Cyc. OF FED. Pn ,c. (2d ed. 1943) §§ 278, 282; see Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U. S. 237 (1934) (where the question vas mooted).
110. Torquay Corporation v. Radio Corporation of America, 2 F. Supp. 841, 844
(S. D. N. Y. 1932) (action in New York state court to enjoin the carring out of a con nt
decree entered in the federal district court for Delav,are removed to the Southern District of
New York, and dismissed; there were also other grounds for dismizzal).
111. Rule 7(b).
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ancillary remedies today cannot, therefore, be explained in terms of
pure procedure.
There are perhaps some substantive differences between the two
methods, if the rule of United States v. Throckmorlon 112 still obtains.
Under this decision, an independent action to enjoin the enforcement
of a judgment will lie only where the fraud, accident, or mistake com-
plained of was extrinsic in character. But the later Supreme Court
case of Marshall v. Holmes "3 gave relief from intrinsic fraud, and put
the basis for relief at large upon the following very general terms:
"While, as a general rule, a defense cannot be set up in equity
which has been fully and fairly tried at law, and although, in view
of the large powers now exercised by courts of law over their judg-
ments, a court of the United States, sitting in equity, will not as-
sume to control such judgments for the purpose simply of giving a
new trial, it is the settled doctrine that 'any fact which clearly
proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of
which the injured party could not have availed himself in a court of
law, or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was pre-
vented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence
in himself or his agents, will justify an application to a court of
chancery.' " 114
The Third Circuit in following the rule of Marshall v. Holmes has
recently remarked:
"In our judgment, and if the case arises, the harsh rule of United
Statds v. Throckmorton . . . will be modified in accordance with
the more salutary doctrine of Marshall v. Holmes. . . . We believe
truth is more important than the trouble it takes to get it." 11
Furthermore at times it is a journey into futility to attempt a distinc-
tion between extrinsic and intrinsic matter. Some of the more recent
California cases have illustrated this."6 A further illustration from
the federal field is Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Callicolte."'
Whether Callicotte's injuries had resulted in permanent paralysis of his
lower limbs was one of the main issues litigated in the personal injury
action that terminated in a favorable judgment for Callicotte. There-
after the railroad learned that the paralysis had been feigned and suc-
cessfully sued to enjoin the enforcement of the judgment. Not only
did Callicotte and certain of his family and friends testify falsely, but
112. 98 U. S. 61 (1878). See'p. 648 supra.
113. 141 U. S. 589 (1891).
114. Id. at 596.
115. Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F. (2d) 949, 952 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied 308
U. S. 624 (1940).
116. See Caldwell v. Taylor, Stenderup v. Broadway State Bank, Hallett v. Slaughter,
and Bartell v. Johnson, cited note 80 supra.
117. 267 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920), cert. denied 255 U. S. 570 (1921).
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by the use of drugs and a false medical history of the case he had fooled
one of his own doctors and other doctors, including those of the railroad
who had examined him before trial. The Eighth Circuit held that be-
cause of the facts, additional to perjury, extrinsic fraud a,s involved."5
Few will question the justice of granting relief to the railroad from
Callicotte's de luxe reinforced perjury, but the judgment was no more
fraudulent than any that results from successful perjury. Accordingly,
it seems that little is to be gained by classifying successful fraud into
intrinsic and extrinsic categories; and that "the more reasonable
course to pursue would be to weigh the degree of fraud and the diligence
with which such was unearthed and proceeded on." 115 This rationale,
also, applies to relief by an independent action on other grounds such
as accident and mistake.
Auvita Querela. The writ of audita querela was a common law .,,Tit
that originated in the fourteenth century, about the tenth year of the
reign of Edward III.1"' Sir William Blackstone speaks of it in this
fashion:
118. It was necessary to classify the case as one of extrinsic fraud, since the Eighth Cir-
cuit did not regard the Marshall case as being in conflict with the Tlrocnzorlon case. In the
Annotation to the Callicotle case, 16 A. L. R. 386, 397, on the subject of fraud or perjury as
to physical condition resulting from injury as ground for relief from or injunction against a
judgment for personal injuries, the commentator, however, states: " ith the e.xception of
the reported case the authorities upon the question under annotation, applying the general
rule that a judgment will not be set aside for fraud or perjury unless it be extrinsic or col-
lateral to the matter originally tried, have denied relief against the judgment."
119. 3 MooRE 3269; (1927) 21 ILL. L. REv. 833; (1927) 12 Cons. L. Q. 385; and see
(1934) 23 CaLuF. L. Rtv. 79, 84 commenting on the Wisconsin experience in granting inde-
pendent relief from both intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.
An independent action in the federal court, based on diversity, to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a state judgment would be subject to a state statute of limitations or a state do=-
trine of laches, as the case may be, which would bar a like independent action in the state
court. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945); see Comment (1946) 55 YA.E L. J.
401. An original action in the federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a federal judgment
rendered in an action where jurisdiction was based on diversity presents a slightly different
problem. There is authority, however, for applying the state statute of limitations, if any.
Boone County v. Burlington & Missouri River R. R., 139 U. S. 684 (1891) (suit held barred
by laches also). If the federal judgment sought to be enjoined was rendered in an action
involving a federal matter, it might be contended that this presents a matter upon which
the federal courts, in the absence of an applicable federal statute of limitations, should be
free to apply their own doctrine of laches in the action for injunction. See Holmberg v.
Armhecht, 66 Sup. Ct. 582 (U. S. 1946). But in actions formerly legal, although involving a
federal matter, federal courts have applied state statutes of limitations as a rule of sub-
stantive law in the absence of an applicable federal statute, and even prior to the Yor case,
supra, tended to do likewise in equity suits. 1 MooRE 240, 245-6. The Yorh case and the
union of law and equity under Rule 2 should reinforce that tendency, but the Holmtcrg case
thwarts it. As to what will constitute laches if that doctrine still has any validity, see Hen-
dryx v. Perkins, 114 Fed. 801, 811-2 (C. C. A. 1st, 1902) (9 years constitutes lathes), cert.
denied 187 U. S. 643 (1902).
120. 1 FREEnAx, JuDrGSNTs (5th ed. 1925) § 257.
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"An audita querela is where a defendant, against whom judgment
is recovered, and who is therefore in danger of execution, or perhaps
actually in execution, may be relieved upon good matter of dis-
charge, which has happened since the judgment: As if the plaintiff
hath given him a general release; or if the defendant hath paid the
debt to the plaintiff, without procuring satisfaction to be entered
on the record. In these and the like cases, wherein the defendant
hath good matter to plead, but hath had no opportunity of plead-
ing it, (either at the beginning of the suit, or puis darrein contlin-
ance, which ...must always be before judgment) an audilta
querela lies, in the nature of a bill in equity, to be relieved against
oppression of the plaintiff. . . . [Audita querela] is a writ of a most
remedial nature, and seems to have been invented, lest in any case
there should be an oppressive defect of justice, where a party, who
hath a good defence, is too late to make it in the ordinary forms of
law. But the indulgence now shewn by the courts in granting a
summary relief upon motion, in cases of such evident oppression,
has almost rendered useless the writ of audita querela, and driven
it quite out of practice." 121
While the substance of this exposition is often quoted with general
approval,1 22 Blackstone's reference to audita querela as an equita-
ble action is taken to refer to the character of the proceeding as "equita-
ble!' in nature, although in fact it is an independent common-law
action, the complaint sounds in tort, the proper plea is not guilty, and
damages are recovered if a tort has actually been committed.'23
While it has sometimes been said that "the writ of audita querela
was limited to a ground of discharge occurring subsequent to the entry
of the judgment, and did not extend to matters arising before its rendi-
tion and the proper subject of a defense to the action," 124 a well estab-
lished rule, and certainly the rule followed by the federal cases herein-
after set forth, is that it includes certain matters arising before as well
as after judgment.12 To the extent, however, that relief is accorded for
matters prior to judgment there is little, if any, distinction between
121. 3 BL. CoMm. *405-6.
122. Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. 297, 313 (U. S. 1850); New River Mineral Co. v.
Seeley, 120 Fed. 193, 196 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903); Baker v. Penecost, 171 Tenn. 529, 106 S. W.
(2d) 220 (1937); Long-worth v. Screven, 2 Hill 298, 27 Am. Dec. 381 (S. C. 1834).
123. Avery v. United States, 12 Wall. 304 (U. S. 1870); Little v. Cook, 1 Aikens 363
(Vt. 1826); Longworth v. Screven, 2 Hill 298, 300 (S. C. 1834) ("that writ, as a common law
mode of proceeding ...is a regular suit, where the parties may take issue in law or in fact,
and a regular judghient must be pronounced"); 5 Am. Ju. 491-2; 7 C. J. S. 1281. For a
form of petition for writ of audita querela, see Newhart v. Wolfe, 102 Pa. 561 (1883).
124. Luparelli v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 117 N. J. L. 342, 188 At. 451 (1936),
aff'd 118 N. J. L. 565, 194 Atl. 185 (1937) (although the court made the statement set forth
in the text it gave relief on matter arising before judgment, see infra, n. 153, and text ac-
companying); Baker v. Penecost, 171 Tenn. 529, 106 S. W. (2d) 220 (1937) (dictum).
125. 5 Arm. Jun. 492; 7 C. J. S. 1279.
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coram nobis and audita querela and oftentimes no attempt is made to
keep the remedies separate.""
While audita querela is an independent proceeding, it must be
brought in the trial court which rendered the judgment; 1'-T and may
be brought after the mandate from an appellate court has gone down
in the original proceeding, unless, of course, the matter sought to be
raised is foreclosed by the original proceedings.1 -
Preliminary to a more detailed discussion of the scope of audita
querela it should be noted that although the independent common-law
proceeding of audita querela has given way in the federal courts and in
most state courts to some proceeding thought to be more convenient or
summary, the substance of the remedy is retained in many states, and,
what is more important, in the federal courts. In other words the
formal procedure has generally disappeared, but the substance re-
mains, since the courts look to the scope of audita querela in determin-
ing whether relief from the judgment in question is proper. Some of the
126. In Robertson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 726, 132 S. W. (2d) 69, 71 (1939) (over-
ruled as to certain propositions not here pertinent by Smiflh v. Buhar an, cited irfra, note
177), a person convicted of crime unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court to grant him the
writ of coram nobis "and or" the vrit of audita querela because of perjured and newly dis-
covered evidence. The court stated: "We see but little distinction between the writ of coram
nobis and that of audita querela. Judge Elliott, the distinguished jurist who w.rote the lead.
ing case of Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 313, 44 Am. Rep. 29, had before him the writ of coram
nobis, but a careful reading of that opinion will show that he in effect granted the vrit of
audita querela. Sanders was indicted for the murder of his vife and when the case was called
for trial an ominous mob surrounded the court house intent upon lynching the defendant.
Under the duress of his counsel and the attaches of the court, if not the trial judge himslf,
Sanders entered a plea of guilty without presenting his defense. The vit of corarn nobis was
granted not because of any mistake of fact but rather to relieve Sanders from durez3 and
oppression, and to allow him to present a defense which was not available to him at the time
of trial. As Judge Elliott made no distinction between the vrts of coram nobis and audita
querela, we will not attempt to do so here." And Freeman states of audita querela: "It is
. . . sometimes sanctioned in cases where the writ of coram nobis seems peculiarly appro-
priate." 1 FREEMA, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 257, pp. 517-S.
127. Manning v. Phillips, 65 Ga. 548 (18S0); Eureka Casualty Co. v. Municipal Court
of City of Los Angeles, 136 Cal. App. 195, 28 P. (2d) 708 (1934); Eureka Casualty Co. v.
Municipal Court, 136 Cal. App. 261, 28 P. (2d) 709 (1934). In the Eure.a, Casualty cases a
surety's bail was forfeited in the municipal court. Thereafter the surety moved this court to
vacate the forfeiture alleging that it had discovered the defendant had died. The municipl
court denied the motion. The surety then filed in the superior court his p2tition for a writ
of audita querela. Held, denied. While a proceeding equivalent to petition for writ of audita
querela is authorized when duly taken by motion for new trial or for relief from judgment
granted through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the motion must be
made in the court of original jurisdiction, and hence is not available in the Superior court to
have the municipal court judgment vacated.
128. Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. 297 (U. S. 1850). If this principle is not implicit in
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 762, 132 S. W. (2d) 69 (1939), it has ben definitely
established in Smith v. Buchanan, infra, note 177.
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procedural substitutes for the writ of audita querela are: motion; 12
rule to show cause; 130 statutory certiorari; 1I statutory affidavit of
illegality; 112 suit in equity. 3
129. Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334 (U. S. 1852); Landes v. Brant, 10 How, 348
(U. S. 1850); Jones v. Watts, 142 F. (2d) 575, 577 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) ("In present day
practice the validity of money judgments which are in execution may be tested in three
ways: (1) By motion to quash . . . (2) Affidavit of Illegality, under Statutes . . . (3) In-
junction, by a suit in equity."); Longworth v. Screven, 2 Hill 298, 27 Am. Dec. 381 (S. C.
1834); Barnett v. Gitlitz, 290 Ill. App. 212, 8 N. E. (2d) 517 (1937) (defendant's motion to
vacate plaintiff's judgment or in the alternative that the court satisfy or record the judgment
was in the nature of a writ of audita querela and should be granted in this case); Eureka Casu-
alty Co. v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles (2 cases), supra n. 127; Hill v. Delaunay,
34 Ga. 427 (1866) (see n. 132 infra); Electric Plaster Co. v. Blue Rapids City Township,
81 Kan. 730, 732-3, 106 Pac. 1079, 1080 (1910) ("As a substitute for audila querela our
practice affords the same remedy either by motion or petition. . . . While the writ itself
has become obsolete the remedy still exists in a proper case. The prayer of the petition in
this case is that the judgment be vacated and a new trial granted, and the action is brought
under §§ 568 and 570 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 5054, 5056), upon
the grounds set forth in the fourth subdivision of § 568, which authorizes the district court
to vacate or modify a judgment at or after the term, 'for fraud practised by the successful
party in obtaining it.' " Held, relief denied because the fraud involved, perjury, was in-
trinsic.); 15 Am. Dec. 695 (Annotation: "The proceeding by writ of audita querela is super-
seded in a majority of the states by the more summary method of application for relief by
motion upon notice to the adverse party: (citing cases). And, as a general rule, wherever
audita querela would lie at common law, relief may now be obtained on motion."),' 20 L. Ed.
405 (Annotation: "Remedy by motion may now be obtained in most States where formerly
the party would have been entitled to audita querela." [citing cases]).
130. Luparelli v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 117 N. J. L. 342, 188 Atl. 451 (1936),
aft'd, 118 N. J. L. 565, 194 Atl. 185 (1937).
131. Baker v. Penecost, 171 Tenn. 529, 531, 106 S. W. (2d) 220, 221 (1937) ("Section
8990 of the Code provides: 'Certiorari lies: (1) On suggestion of diminution; (2) where no
appeal is given; (3) as a substitute for appeal; (4) instead of audita querela; (5) instead of
writ of error.' ").
132. Hill v. DeLaunay, 34 Ga. 427, 428-9 (1866) ("The proceeding by illegality, given
by our statute, has been substituted for the writ of Audita Querela in England. Formerly,
the writ was resorted to to correct all errors which are redressed here by illegality. The
remedy by illegality is cumulative, not exclusive. In modem practice, the writ of Audita
Querela has been superseded almost entirely by motion . . . and the same relief is now
afforded by motion which was formerly granted by said writ. Much more, in this State,
should the proceeding by illegality be superseded by motion, which is more cheap and expe.
ditious, especially where the facts are all before the Court and none of them disputed.");
Manning v. Phillips, 65 Ga. 548 (1880); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Whitaker, 172
Ga. 663, 666, 158 S. E. 416, 418 (1931) ("The remedy by affidavit of illegality is statutory,
and applies generally only to the arrest of executions based upon judgments of courts, and
not to the arrest of executions issued ex parte by a ministerial officer."). An affidavit of
illegality may be authorized by statute where the judgment has been satisfied, settled, or
become dormant for failure to enforce it for a specified period of time, or where the judgment
is void. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANx. § 39, 1001-9; 33 C. J. S. §§ 147-50.
133. Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. 297 (U. S. 1850); New River Mineral Co. v. Seeley,
120 Fed. 193, 196 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 762, 132 S. W.
(2d) 69 (1939); and see In re Drainage Dist. No. 7, 25 F. Supp. 372, 383 (E. D. Ark. 1938),
aff'd, 104 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), cert. denied 308 U. S. 604,(1939).
[VCol. 55: 623
1946] FEDERAL RELIEF FROM1 CIVIL JUDGMENTS 663
As early as 1834 the South Carolina court stated that the indulgence
of the courts, in granting summary relief upon motion, had rendered
useless the writ and driven it out of practice both in England and
this country.134 In 1850 the United States Supreme Court stated
that a motion -as familiar practice in cases where audita querela was
proper,13 5 and two years, later in holding that a motion was a proper
substitute, made this clear pronouncement:
it is believed to be the settled modern practice, that in all
instances in which irregularities could formerly be corrected upon
a writ of error coram vobis or audita querela, the same objects may
be effected by motion to the court, as a mode more simple, more
expeditious, and less fruitful of difficulty and expense." 1Z1
But while evolving this simple and forthright practice, the Court did
not insist upon use of the motion. Thus, a suit in equity to enjoin
enforcement of a federal judgment at law was sustained in a case
where the principles of audita querela -wiranted relief.rr The flexi-
bility of this approach which does not require resort to a particular
procedural remedy is commendable.3 5 Thus, the ancient common law
and equitable remedies for relief from judgments are helpful both when
134. Longworth v. Screven, 2 Hill 298, 299-300, 27 Am. Dec. 331, 332-3 (S. C. 1834).
The court continued: "Where the facts are doubtful, and the Court should be unwilling or
unable to decide them, an issue might be ordered, which I think has been the practice in this
State; and then such an issue would become the substitute for the formal and technical vrit
of audita guerda, and answer the same end. Or the party complaining might be put to that
writ, as a common law mode of proceeding, which is a regular suit, where the parties may take
issue in law or in fact, and a regular juIgment must be pronounced. 1 Mass. 101; 17 Johns.
Rep. 484. I should be unwilling to say that it is so far obsolete that our Courts would not
allow it, if preferred. The present motion is therefore considered as a substitute for the vwrit
of audita querela, . .."
135. Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348, 371 (U. S. 1850); Humphrey- s'. Leggett, 9 How,.
297, 313 (U. S. 1850) (". . . although it [audita querela] is said to be in its nature a bill in
equity, yet, in modern practice, courts of law usually afford the same remedy on motion in
a summary way."-per Grier, J.).
136. Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334, 345 (U. S. 1852).
137. Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. 297, 313, 314 (U. S. 1850) (... courts of equity
usually grant a remedy by injunction against a judgment at law, upon the same principleo.
... He [the judgment debtor] is . . .in the s-ame condition as if the defence had arkan
after judgment, which would entitle him to relief by audita querela, or a bill in equity for an
injunction.")
138. For an excellent example, see In re Rothrock, 14 Cal. (2d) 34,92 P. (2d) 634 (1939).
The California Supreme Court describes the proceedings in this manner: "By this consoli-
dated proceeding, the applicant ... has moved and petitioned this court for writ of corarn
nobis, writ of audita guerda, writ of Wabeas corpus, writ of certiorari, recall of rermititur, revo-
cation and annulment of judgment, subpoena ducaes lecum, production of documents, parmis-
sion to appear and testify, and other and further relief. Uncertain of his remedy, petitioner
has couched his plea in these various forms, but the allegations in each instance are identical,
and the prayer in substance is that, regardless of form, he be given the relief to which the
facts entitle him." Id. at 635.
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the simple motion is a satisfactory substitute on the formal level and
when they are used merely as guideposts in determining whether the
case is proper for disturbing the finality of a judgment.
Now to proceed with audita querela as a guidepost to substance. It
did not lie to correct mere judicial error, the remedy here being a
motion for a new trial or a writ of error."' This seems proper since in
the interest of the finality of judgments the definite time limits for a
new trial or appeal should not be circumvented by a motion of audita
querela, where the only time limit is laches. Nor could it be used to ob-
tain relief from intrinsic fraud, such as perjury, in a jurisdiction where a
bill to enjoin would lie only for extrinsic fraud. 140 While it had charac-
teristics of a bill in equity, it could not be utilized to set aside an execu-
tion sale of particular lands where the judgment creditor had a legal
right to levy thereon; 1 nor to quash an execution levy upon property
subject to a mortgage executed by the judgment debtor where the
judgment creditor proceeded on the theory that the mortgage was a
fraudulent transfer and hence had the legal right to disregard the
mortgage. 42 On the other hand on principles somewhat analogous to
relief from an injunction that has been rendered inequitable because
of a change of circumstances,4 3 a bankruptcy court has refused to give
effect to a finding, underlying a state court judgment, that was ren-
dered baseless by subsequent facts. 44 Audita querela was proper to
139. Little v. Cook, 1 Aikens 363, 15 Am. Dec. 698 (Vt. 1826); Shear v. Flint, 17 Vt. 497
(1845) (not permissible where a writ of error is proper by the common law, as where right to
jury trial was denied, though the right of appeal is taken away by statute).
140. Electric Plaster Co. v. Blue Rapids City Township, 91 Kan. 730, 106 Pac. 1079
(1910) (see note 129, supra); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 762, 132 S. W. (2d) 69
(1939) (see note 126 supra).
141. Longworth v. Screven, 2 Hill 298, 27 Am. Dec. 381 (S. C. 1834) (A purchaser of
land which was subject to the lien of a judgment, and which was afterwards sold under it,
cannot set aside the levy and sale on the ground that the defendant in the execution had at
the time other lands and personalty sufficient to satisfy the execution.).
142. Baker v. Penecost, 171 Tenn. 529, 106 S. W. (2d) 220 (1937).
143. See note 64, supra.
144. In re Drainage Dist. No. 7, 25 F. Supp. 372, 383 (1938) (In the reorganization of a
drainage district, Haverstick claimed priority for his state court judgment amounting to
$20,000 because the Arkansas Supreme Court had found that his land was "totally and per-
manently destroyed for agricultural purposes" by certain acts of the drainage district. Yet
within a year after that pronouncement the Haverstick land was completely reclaimed. In
denying priority to the Haverstick judgment, the court said: "Throughout our jurisprudence
there has always been some method of correcting a judgment which becomes unjust by subse-
quent developments. The original common law method was by a writ of audita querela but
the modern remedy is by proceeding in equity. . . . It would not be just to give Haverstick
a preference based on an announcement of the Supreme Court [of Arkansas] which is ren-
dered baseless by subsequent facts."), aff 'd 104 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), cerl. denied
308 U. S. 604 (1939).
See also Wetmore v. Law, 34 Barb. 515 (N. Y. 1860) (where an injunction has been
granted because of the absence of any legal right and this objection has since been removed
by valid statute, the injunction may be vacated on motion as a substitute for audita querela).
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challenge the validity of a judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the
defendant's person, whether the record failed to or did show jurisdic-
tion.14 It has also been utilized to vacate judgments taken under the
following circumstances: against a lunatic whose guardian was not
notified; 14 against an infant who defended without appointment of a
guardian; 147 where, during the pendency of the suit, the defendant paid
145. Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 334, 345 (U. S. 1852) (A default judgment was
entered May, 1839 on substituted service; the marshal's return failed, however, to show
proper substituted service. A writ of fieri facias was sued out in March, 1840, levied, and
defendant executed a forthcoming bond on April 20, 1840. In pursuance of this forthcoming
bond another fieri facias was sued out June 11, 1840. Upon defendant's motion at the May
term, 1850, until which time the proceeding had been stayed, the court set aside the judg-
ment, and quashed the forthcoming bond and fieri facias. Mr. Justice Daniel stated: "At
the time of the motion ... judgment was still unsatisfied, and vws in the progress of exe-
cution, and the forthcoming bond, filed in the clerk's office, according to the la3;s of the
State, was properly a part of the process of execution, the fled facias being sued out therein
from the office vithout any order of the court. The proceedings then, still being as it were
in fieri, and not terminated, it vas competent for the court to rectify any irregularity which
might have occurred in the progress of the cause, and to do this either by v rit of error coram
vobis, or by audita querela if the party choose to resort to the latter mode. If this position be
maintainable, then, there would seem to be an entire removal of all exception to the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court as it is believed to be the settled modem practice, that in all in-
stances in which irregularities could formerly be corrected upon a vrit of error coram vobis
or audita querela, the same objects may be effected by motion to the court, as a mode more
simple, more expeditious, and less fruitful of difficulty and expense."); New River Mineral
Co. v. Seeley, 120 Fed. 193, 196 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903). (The general manager in Virginia of a
New York corporation sued it in the federal court in Virg inia and cauzed the booeldepar,
who was under his control, to accept service for the corporation, and subsequently tool: a
default judgment. The corporation had no other notice of the suit until months after the
judgment was rendered. Held, bill to vacate judgment sustained as a substitute for the writ
of audita querela.); see Landes v. Brant, 10 How. 348, 371 (U. S. 1850) (If the judgment
was voidable for want of notice although the judgment recited " 'that the paries appeared
by their attorneys and dispensed vith a jury, and submitted the facts to the court,' then it
should have been set aside by an audita querela, or on petition and motion; such being the
familiar practice in similar cases"); Jones v. Watts, 142 F. (2d) 575, 576 (C. C. A. Sth, 1944)
("If these appellants can by proper and sufficient evidence show that they were never cerved
they are entitled to a remedy. An ancient remedy in courts of law Nas by audila gverda in
the court which rendered the judgment, and without limit of time. In modem practice this
procedure has been substituted by motion in the cause, -with notice, or by statutory reme-
dies."); compare United States v. One Trunk Containing Fourteen Pieces of Embroidery,
155 Fed. 651 (E. D. N. Y. 1907) (court lacked power and could not in its discretion relieve a
person, at a subsequent term, from a default judgment of forfeiture entered after due service
of process).
In Georgia where the statutory affidavit of illegality has been substituted for the wit of
audita querela it is provided: "If the defendant shall not have been served and does not ap-
pear, he may take advantage of the defect by affidavit of illegality; but if he shall have had
his day in court, he may not go behind the judgment by an affidavit of illegality." GA.
CODE A-ws. § 39-1009.
For the California practice, see notes 66, 69 supra.
146. Lincoln v. Flint, 18 Vt. 247 (1846). Cf. Olivera v. Grace, 19 CaL (2d) 570, 122 P.
(2d) 564 (1924), set out in note 78 supra.
147. Starbird v. Moore, 21 Vt. 529 (1848).
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the debt but the plaintiff nevertheless took judgment; 143 and where
judgment was taken after the action was discontinued by agreement, 14 9
or by failure of the parties to appear for trial.' Subject to the qualifi-
cation that audita querela may not be used where the party complain-
ing has had a legal opportunity of defense and has neglected it,' it is
proper to present defenses in existence prior to, but not as a practical
matter available before, judgment. Examples are: death of the prin-
cipal, unknown to the surety, prior to forfeiture of the surety's bail; 12
that the insurer has paid a certain amount under the policy to the
mortgagee who has credited the insured accordingly, but the insured
recovers judgment for the full amount of the policy; "I where between
the time of a judgment in the surety's favor in the federal circuit court
and its reversal by the United States Supreme Court, judgment against
the surety is recovered by a different party, and satisfaction is had in
the state court for the full amount of the bond.' Audita querela has
148. Lovejoy v. Webber, 10 Mass. 101 (1813).
149. See Jenney v. Glynn, 12 Vt. 480 (1839) (but audita querela denied because the
parties had not consented to a discontinuance).
150. Pike v. Hill, 15 Vt. 183 (1843).
151. Avery v. United States, 12 Wall. 304 (U. S. 1870) (During the Civil War the
United States took possession of A's warehouse as "capiured and abandoned property," and
received rents approximating $7,000. After the war the government sued A as surety on a
postmaster's bond and recovered judgment approximating $5,000. Subsequently A applied
to the court to satisfy the judgment and also for a writ of audita querela, assigning as a rea-
son for not having pleaded a set-off that he did not know until just before he filed his peti-
tion and made his motion that the rent money was in the federal treasury. Held, petition
and motion were rightly denied, for if A had a claim of set-off he was at fault in not having
discovered and pleaded it.); United States v. One Trunk Containing Fourteen Pieces of
Embroidery, 155 Fed. 651 (E. D. N. Y. 1907) (although, said the court, from the standpoint
of discretion the application to open default judgment of forfeiture would be appealing).
152. See Eureka Casualty cases, supra, n. 127.
153. Luparelli v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 117 N. J. L. 342, 188 Atl. 451 (1936)
(Defendant insurer admitted liability and paid to the mortgagee $350, but denied liability
to insured on the policy of $2,000. The insured, nevertheless, recovered judgment for that
amount. Although the insured judgment-creditor has received a credit from the mortgagee
of $350 he seeks to execute his judgment in full against the insurer. The insurer tendered the
amount of the judgment less $350 and sought satisfaction of the judgment. Held, granted.),
aff'd 118 N. J. L. 565, 194 Adt. 185 (1937).
154. Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. 297 (U. S. 1850) (The state court judgments were
entered at the May term, 1840. In February, 1845, the Supreme Court reversed the federal
circuit court's judgment entered against the surety. The surety then offered in the clcult
court his plea of payment of the bond puis darrein continuance, but the plea was refused
because of the Supreme Court's mandate. The surety then instituted his suit in equity to
enjoin enforcement of the federal judgment. Held, judgment for the surety. "The mandate
from this court was, probably, made without reference to the possible consequences that
might flow from it. At all events, it operated unjustly, by precluding the complainant from
an opportunity of making a just and legal defence to the action. The payment was made
while the cause was pending here. The party was guilty of no laches, but lost the benefit of
his defence, by an accident over which he had no control. He is, therefore, in the same con-
[Vol. 55;: 623
1946] FEDERAL RELIEF FROM CIVIL JUDGMENTS 667
also been useful to show matter arising subsequent to entry of judg-
ment, such as satisfaction or discharge, in whole or in part.115 This
general principle has been utilized where two suits on the same cause
of action and between the same parties proceed in different forums to
judgment at the same time so that satisfaction of either judgment may
be shown in discharge of the other.'- Admittedly this latter example
is atypical. But there are recurring instances that present difficulty
where a second judgment is based upon a prior judgment, or matter
conclusively established by it, and the first judgment is subsequently
reversed. First take the case where an appeal in the second action
would go to the same court that reversed the first judgment. In this
situation if an appeal is taken from the second judgment, the appellate
court may take judicial notice of its action in the first case and make
proper disposition of the second appeal. 7 But if no appeal is taken in
the second action the Supreme Court ruled in Reed v. Allen ir- that the
second judgment is res judicata of the matters therein adjudged; and
the result of this case was that a party adjudged by the appellate court
on the merits in the first action to be entitled to certain property was
precluded by the second and unappealed judgment based solely on the
first and subsequently reversed decision from obtaining the property
in a third and subsequent action. Now take the case where the second
judgment is rendered in a different forum so that the appeal goes to a
different appellate court. This court will not take judicial notice of the
reversal of the first judgment arid, unless this matter can be brought
into the record by amended or supplemental pleadings, it is not avail-
able on appeal. Moreover, the judgment in the second action is not
subject to collateral attacl." Clearly there should be some flexible
procedure that affords relief, and if that second judgment is a federal
judgment there must be some procedure that affords relief after the
running of the relatively short periods of time for a new trial, for ap-
peal, and for relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b). The principles
dition as if the defense had arisen after judgment, which would entitle him to relief by
audita querela, or a bill in equity for an injunction." Id. at 314).
155. Doerr v. Schmitt, 375 Ill. 470, 31 N. E. (2d) 971 (1941); Barnett v. Gitlitz, 290 I1.
App. 212, 8 N. E. (2d) 517 (1st Dist. 2d Div. 1937). Insofar as Johnon v. Finn, 294 I1.
App. 616, 14 N. E. (2d) 240 (1938) holds contra it must be considered as overruled by the
Doerr case; itis, however, correctly decided on the point that the corporate reorganization of
the debtor does not discharge the debtor's guarantor.
156. See Bownev. Joy, 9 Johns. 221 (N.Y. 1812).
157. Butler v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 240 (1891).
158. Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191 (1932), 81 A. L. R. 703. This case and sub7equent
developments are set out in detail in 1 AlooRE, at 165-8.
159. Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499 (1903) (federal court judgment bared on
Kentucky judgment subsequently reversed, may not be disregarded by Kentuckv courts):
State v. Tillotson, 85 Kan. 577, 117 Pac. 1030 (1911).
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underlying audita querela for judgments at law and bill of review for
decrees in equity do afford relief.'
The unique advantages of employing the substantive principles of
audita querela on a motion are three. First, because the motion repre-
sents a simple procedure, familiar to the federal courts as a substitute
for the independent procedure of audita querela. 1' 1 Second, the sub-
stance of audita querela, as outlined above, affords warranted relief in
situations not covered by Rule 60(b), apart from the first saving
clause. 6 2 Third, because if an independent action must be brought,
160. Ballard v. Searles, 130 U. S. 50 (1889) (bill of review proper where second decree
was equitable); Merchants' Ins. Co. v. DeWolf, 33 Pa. 45, 46, 75 Am. Dec. 577 (1859)
(". . . on a reversal of the first judgment, the defendant shall have a right to audita querela;
or, perhaps, to a writ of error coram nobis, to have the court below reverse its own proceed.
ings and award restitution. . . ."); see Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499, 512 (1903)
("It is to be remembered that we are not dealing with the right of the parties to get relief
from the original judgment by bill of review or other process in the federal court in which it
was rendered. There the court may reconsider and set aside or modify its judgment upon
seasonable application.").
161. See p. 663 supra.
162. The following is a summary where audita querela affords relief, subject only to the
time limit of laches, but relief is either not afforded or its attainment is doubtful under
Rule 60(b), apart from the saving clause, even within six months:
1) From a finding of a judgment rendered baseless by subsequent facts, see note 144,
supra;
2) Where jurisdiction over the defendant was not obtained, see note 145, supra; (con-
ceivably the elimination of the word "his" in the proposed amendment to Rule 60(b), see
p. 688, infra, might warrant relief on the theory that the court had made a mistake or acted
inadvertently in entering judgment without jurisdiction of the defendant);
3) Where judgment is irregularly entered against infants or incompetents, see notes
146-7, supra; (conceivably the elimination of the word "his" by the proposed amendment
(see infra) might warrant relief under Rule 60(b));
4) Where between the time of a judgment in the surety's favor in the federal circuit
court and its reversal by the United States Supreme Court, judgment against the surety in
recovered by a different party and satisfaction is had in the state court for the full amount
of the bond, see note 154, supra;
5) Where a judgment is subsequently discharged in whole or in part, see note 155,
supra;
6) Where two judgments are entered at the same time, but in different forums, on the
same cause of action and one judgment is subsequently discharged, see note 156, supra;
7) Where a second judgment is entered on the basis of an earlier judgment which Is
subsequently reversed, see notes 157-160, supra.
Rule 60(b) would afford relief, but only within the time limit of six months, In the fol-
lowing cases:
1) Where the plaintiff went ahead and took judgment despite the settlement of the
claim by the defendant, or an agreement of the parties that the action be dismissed, see notes
148-50, supra; (certainly this would be true under the proposed amendment to Rule 60(b),
see p. 691, infra, which authorizes relief from a judgment on the ground of "(3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other miscon-
duct of an adverse party.");
2) Where a defense was in existence prior to judgment but could not be availed of as a
practical matter, see notes 152-4, supra.
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relief cannot be obtained from judgments in favor of the United
States. 6 3 According to Jones v. Watts,'" while an independent action
against the United States could not be maintained by the judgment
debtor because of the sovereign's immunity from suit, and while audita
querela was an independent action within the immunity rule,C5 never-
theless, the substance of audita querela was still available by motion
made in the original proceeding, subject only to laches.
Writ of Error Coram Nobis (or Coram Vobis). The distinction be-
tween coram nobis and coram vobis is only nominal. Tidd explains
it in this fashion. If the proceeding was brought in the King's Bench
to set aside a judgment of that court it was called a "writ of error
coram nobis, or quae coram nwbis residzent, so called from its being
founded on the record and process, which are stated in the writ to
remain in the court of the lord the king, before the king himself....
In the Common-Pleas, the record and process being stated to remain
before the king's justices, the writ of error is called a writ of error
coram vobis, or quae coram vobis resident." CI The term coram nobis
will be used hereinafter since it is more commonly used in the cases.
A necessary distinction, however, is that the writ of error and the
writ of error coram nobis served entirely different functions and were
akin only in name and the fact that both were common law writs. The
function of the writ of error was to bring a judgment of an inferior
court before a higher court, having appellate jurisdiction, for purposes
of review on questions of law. The writ of error coram nobis, on the
other hand, was a writ to the same court which rendered the judgment
to have that judgment set aside because of error in fact, which Tidd
characterized as "not the error of the judges, and reversing it is not
reversing their own judgment." 17
While Blackstone noted the remedial possibilities of audita querela
and his discussion has served as a starting point for many courts, 1C3 he
made no mention of coram nobis. The writ, however, had long been in
use before he wrote, lf'9 and Judge Cooley and other editors of the Com-
163. Avery v. United States, 12 Wall. 304 (U. S. 1870); Jones v. Watts, 142 F. (2d) 575
(C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
164. 142 F. (2d) 575 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
165. This had been established by Avery v. United States, supra, note 163.
166. 2 TIDD, PRAcTicE iN PERSONAL AcTioNs (1807) 1056. Cf. Camp v. Bennett, 16
Wend. 48, 51 (N. Y. 1836) on this nominal matter to the effect that the name coram nobia is
not appropriate in New York, since "the record represents the fact as it really takes place,
before the justices of the supreme court."
167. 2 TIDD, ikc. cir. supra, note 166.
And hence a statute governing the time for suing out a writ of error does not apply to a
writ of error coram nobis. Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 23 Fed. Cas. 236, No. 13, 537
(C. C. D. Va. 1810) (opinion by Marshall, C. J.).
168. See pp. 659-60, supra.
169. See Jacques v. Cesax, 2 Saund. 100 (1682).
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mentaries have appended notes calling attention to the old common
law writ of coram nobis 70
The Supreme Court, at an early date, recognized that coram nobis
was firmly rooted in the old common law and explained Blackstone's
failure to mention the writ as due to the use of the motion to obtain its
substance.' 7 ' The Tennessee court also comments in this fashion:
"The writ of error coram nobis, under our Code, may come in for the
praise bestowed by Sir William Blackstone upon the audita querela, as
a 'writ of most remedial nature, which seems to have been invented
lest in any way there should be an oppressive defect of justice.' " 172
There is little, if any, distinction between coram nobis and audita
querela so far as the latter proceeding is utilized to give relief for matter
preceding the rendition of judgment; 171 although audita querela is
broader in scope in that it also gives relief for matter arising subse-
quent to judgment, such as discharge. 7 4
In United States v. Mayer, 75 after stating that the writs of error
coram nobis or vobis were available to bring before the court that
rendered the judgment errors in matters of fact which had not been
put in issue or passed upon and were material to the validity and
regularity of the legal proceeding itself,78 the Court went on to hold
that a juror's bias against the defendant, although concealed on his
voir dire examination for the purpose of securing the jury fees, was a
proper basis for a new trial but was not within the scope of coram
nobis. 71 On the other hand, the leading case of Sanders v. State 178 held
170. BL. Comz&x. (Cooley's 2d ed. 1873). 3 id. (Couch ed. 1844) 406 n. 3; 2 id, (Shars-
wood ed. 1866) 406-7, n. 5; 2 id. (Jones ed. 1916) 2019-21, notes 4, 5.
171. In Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 7 Pet. 144, 147, 148 (U. S. 1833), Mr. Justice
Johnson stated: "It cannot be questioned that the appropriate use of the writ of error coram
vobis, is to enable a court to correct its own errors; those errors which precede the rendition
of judgment. In practice the same end is now generally attained by motion; sustained, if the
case require it, by affidavits; and it is observable, that so far as the latter mode superseded
the former in the British practice, that Blackstone does not even notice this suit among his
remedies ... the cases for error coram vobis, are enumerated without any material varia-
tion in all the books of practice, and rest on the authority of the sages and fathers of the
law."
But Blackstone had dealt with audita querela, although, as he recognized, the motion
had become its procedural substitute. See text accompanying note 121, supra.
172. Jones v. Pearce, 59 Tenn. 281, 286 (1873).
173. See note 126, supra.
174. See notes 155, 156, 160, supra.
175. 235 U. S. 55, 68 (1914).
176. See also along substantially the same lines Jacques v. Cesar, 2 Saund. 100 (1682);
Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood 7 Pet. 144, 148 (U. S. 1833); Bronson v. Schulten 104 U. S.
410, 416 (1882); also Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 23 Fed. Cas. 236, No. 13, 537 (C. C. D.
Va. 1810) (judgment against a defendant, who had died, set aside 14 years later); 2 TDD,
loc. cit. supra note 166.
177. Referring to coram nobis the Court stated: "This jurisdiction was of limited scope;
the power of the court thus to vacate its judgments for. errors of fact existed, as already
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that a defendant was entitled, by the principles of coram nobis, to
have a judgment of conviction set aside and a new trial, where his
trial was a sham because of mob violence. In this case, a motion for
new trial would have been unavailing, since, under the state statute,
it had to be made before judgment and judgment was pronounced
while the mob dominated the court. In the .Mayer case, the time for
new trial had run before the ground therefor was known. The Sanders
case differs then from the Mayer case only in the extent of the prejudice,
and so the two seem irreconcilable. For while the degree of unfairness
may properly be considered in determining whether a court is justified
in disturbing the finality of a judgment, the court's power over its
judgment should not depend upon such factors. 171
Other cases illustrate that the basis of coram nobis is narrow, and
oftentimes a case that is beyond its scope is as meritorious as one
within its purview. Thus coramn nobis affords an infant relief from an
adverse judgment where he was not represented by a guardian or
prochein ami, although he appeared by attorney.' 3 But where a
stated, in those cases where the errors were of the most fundamental character; that is, such
as rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid. In cases of prejudicial misconduct in
the course of the trial, the misbehavior or partiality of jurors, and newly discovered evidence,
as well as where it is sought to have the court in which the case -a tried rcconsider it-
rulings, the remedy is by a motion for a new trial (Judicial Code, § 269)-an application
which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and, in accordance with the
established principles which have been repeatedly set forth in the decision of this court above
cited, cannot be entertained, in the absence of a different statutory rule, after the expiration
of the term at which the judgment was entered." United States v. Mlayer, 235 U. S. 55, 69
(1914).
The court expressly left open the question whether the substance of the writ of coram
nobis was available in the federal courts in a criminal case. That it is, see Robinson v.
Johnston, 118 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) rermanded for furlier proceedings or. Ober
grounds, 316 U. S. 649 (1942). And it is extensively utilized in state practice. People v.
Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 232 Pac. 457 (1924) (but the statutory remedies of appeal and new trial
supplant the writ to the extent that they cover the subject); Lamb v. Florida, 91 Fla. 396,
107 So. 535 (1926) (and is available after affirmance); Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882);
Smith v. Buchanan, 291 Ky. 44, 163 S. W. (2d) 5 (1942) (affirmance by an appellate court
creates no obstacle to the utilization of coram nobis, and overruling Robertson v. Common-
wealth, 279 Ky. 762, 132 S. W. (2d) 619 (1939) cited. supra, note 126 so far as it is inconsist-
ent); Mitchell v. Mississippi, 179 Miss. 814, 176 So. 743 (1937) (writ may issue to determine
whether insanity has developed since the trial of the accused, but not the issue of his in-
sanity at the time of the commission of a crime or at the time of his trial); Orfield, Th~e Writ
of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 423, 427-428.
178. 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882) (When arraigned for murder S pleaded not
guilty, but because of threats and imminent danger of lynching which terrified him and his
counsel, and because of the urgent solicitation of his counsel, he withdrew that plea and
pleaded guilty; the court immediately pronounced judgment of life sentence; and S was at
once hurried to the train and conveyed to the State's prison.) For the view that this case in
effect granted the writ of audita querela and not coram nobis, see note 126, supra.
179. Compare discussion of the independent action in equity for fraud, supra p. 659 .
180. See Camp v. Bennett, 16 Wend. 48 (N. Y. 1836); text accompanying note 176,
supra. Audita querela would also lie. See note 147, supra.
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competent party appears and joins issue and the case is regularly
brought on for trial by the plaintiff and judgment had, the fact that the
defendant was no longer represented by counsel and received no notice
of the trial, all of which were known to plaintiff and his counsel, is not
such an extraneous fact that coram nobis will afford relief, even though
the defendant shows that he has a good defense.' A judgment en-
tered upon a stipulation of counsel is, however, subject to coram nobis
by a party whose counsel lacked power to enter into the stipulation. 82
In cases involving mistakes of the judicial machinery, the difference
between relief and no relief depends upon whether the mistake is
classified as clerical or judicial. Thus where a garnishee answered but
the clerk failed to file the answer and a default judgment was taken,
the garnishee could obtain relief.' 8' Where an appellate court dismissed
an appeal on the ground that no final decree had been entered in the
court below, but at the next term of court a corrected transcript was
adduced, showing there had been a final decree which the clerk, through
mistake, had failed to include in the record, the appellate court per-
mitted the reinstatement of the appeal. The case which advanced this
proposition was The Palmyra. 1 4 Mr. Justice Story spoke for the Court:
"Every court must be presumed to exercise those powers belonging
to it, which are necessary for the promotion of public justice; and
we do not doubt that this court possesses the power to reinstate
any cause dismissed by mistake. The reinstatement of the cause
was founded, in the opinion of this court, upon the plain principles
of justice, and is according to the known practice of other judicial
tribunals in like cases." 185
But subsequent cases have not been overly kind to The Palmyra. In
Rice v. Minnesota & Northwestern Railroad,8 6 the Court in a similar
fact situation distinguished The Palmyra as a case in admiralty and
181. Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665 (1886), but without prejudice to defendant's right
to file a bill in equity. That audita querela might have afforded relief, see note 150, supra.
182. See notes 31-4, supra.
183. Jones v. Pearce, 59 Tenn. 281 (1873).
184. 12 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1827).
185. Id. at 10.
186. 21 How. 82, 85 (U. S. 1858). Chief Justice Taney stated: "But it [The Palnyra]
was a case in admiralty, where the power and jurisdiction of an appellate court is much
wider upon appeal, than in a case at common law. For, in an admiralty. case, you may in
this court amend the pleadings, and take new evidence, so as in effect to make it a different
case from that decided by the court below. And the court might well, therefore, deal with the
judgment and appeal of the inferior tribunal in the same spirit. But the powers which an
appellate court may lawfully exercise in an admiralty proceeding, are altogether inadmissible
in a common-law suit."
For a modern point of view that gives the appellate court power over its judgments
whether the mistake be clerical or judicial, see note 138, supra, and compare the Hazel-Atlas
Glass case, note 221, infra.
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refused to apply its holding in a common law action. But the holding
of this case was short lived for it seems to have been overruled sub
silentio by Alkiso v. United States.8 7 The sweep of Mr. Justice Story's
language has, however, been confined by Mr. Justice Day along the
following lines:
"The Palmrya, like every other case, must be read in the light of the
point decided in the case, and in considering the language of Mr.
Justice Story, who spoke of the general power of the court to rein-
state a case dismissed by mistake, it is evident that he had in mind,
for he says so, that the first dismissal was for a clerical mistake,
which is a well-recognized ground for correcting judgments at sub-
sequent terms, upon notice and proper showing." 1E3
Because of this limitation strangely divergent results sometimes follow
from fact situations that are almost identical, as the companion cases,
New England Furniture & Carpet Company v. Willuds 1 and INew
England Furniture & Carpet Company v. United Statesu attest. A
corporate taxpayer simultaneously instituted two suits in the same
district court to recover an alleged overpayment of income taxes. The
defendant in one case was Willcuts, the collector; the defendant in
the second case was the United States, and for convenience we shall
designate this as the government case. Little progress toward trial
was made in either case because of an investigation being made by the
Treasury Department, and on November 2, 1929, an identical stipula-
tion was filed in each case continuing it pending that investigation.
Prior to that time the clerk had placed the Willkuts case on the calendar
apparently because there had been no advancement made in the
pleadings for one year, but had failed to follow the district court rule
requiring 30 days' notice to all counsel; and on April 1, 1930, there
being no appearance, the court dismissed the action. By motion made
in September, 1931, the plaintiff sought to vacate the dismissal order
and reinstate the case; and the court held that the dismissal being due
to a clerical error the judgment could be set aside under the principles
of coram nobis. The government case had followed the same pattern,
187. 6 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1867). An appeal in equity dismiased for want of citation at a
former term, omitted to be returned from neglect of the clerk, was reinstated upon the au-
thority of The Palmyra and without any reference to the Rice case, note 186, supra.
18S. Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141, 155 (1907). It was not necezzary to overrule
the Rice case, supra, note 186; indeed in some ways, it seems to have been re-garded favorably
because of its limitation of The Palmyra.
189. 55 F. (2d) 983 (D. Minn. 1931). "In modern practice, the writ of error coram nobiz
may be defined as a common-law writ issuing out of a court of record to review and correct a
judgment of its own relating to some error in fact as opposed to error in law, not appearing
on the face of the record, unknown at the time without fault to the court and to the partica
seeking relief, but for which the judgment would not have been entered." Id. at 987.
190. 2 F. Supp. 648 (D. Minn. 1931).
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except that the clerk had given the notice required by the district
court rule and the case was properly on the calendar and subject to
dismissal; it was dismissed on April 1, 1930, there being no appearance;
and then by motion made in September, 1931, the plaintiff sought to
vacate the dismissal order. This motion was denied by the same judge,
Judge Nordbye, who had sustained the motion in the Willcuts case. He
noted this distinction:
"There is an entire absence of any clerical mistake, error, or default
cognizable by the writ of error coram nobis. The court, therefore,
is of the opinion that in this case it has lost jurisdiction, and that it
has no other alternative but to deny the motion. It may well be
that plaintiff was lulled into security by the stipulation for con-
tinuance, and the facts presented might justify a court of equity
in granting the relief prayed for."'' ,
But when the corporate taxpayer instituted the suggested suit in equity
it was dismissed, since necessarily it was against the United States and
the sovereign had not consented to be sued. 192
The distinction taken by Judge Nordbye in the Willcuts and the
government case is in line with venerable doctrine concerning coram
nobis, including Supreme Court doctrine 193 and the recent Second
Circuit case of Wallace v. United States.194 His decision is correct on the
historical and technical level, but it seems time for a change in the
law so that control over judgments is placed on a more rational and less
technical basis.
Where the writ is available the only time limit at common law was
laches, 195 and, in a case decided by Marshall on circuit, the writ was
granted fourteen years after judgment. 98 In some states a specific
time limit has been prescribed by judicial decision "I or by statute.08
191. Id.at 650.
192. Ibid.
193. Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U. S. 141 (1907); notes 177, 189. See p. 670, supra.
194. See note 36, supra.
195. Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410 (1881) (no relief where seventeen years had
elapsed after entry of judgment for plaintiff and payment, when the error, if any existed,
only needed a comparison of plaintiff's bill of particulars with the report of the referee, to be
seen, or at least to be suggested); Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130, 79 Am. Dec. 681 (1861);
Scott v. Rees, 300 Mo. 123, 253 S. W. 998 (1923); Powell v. Gott, 13 Mo. 458, 53 Am. Dec.
153 (1850).
196. Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 23 Fed. Cas. 236, No. 13, 567 (C. C. D. Va.
1810); cf. Milam County v. Robertson, note 197, infra, where the death had been noted on
the record.
197. Jeffery v. Fitch, 46 Conn. 601 (1879) (three years on the analogy of a new trial);
Weaver v. Shaw, 5 Tex. 286 (1849) (two years on the analogy of a bill of review limited by
statute to two years); cf. Milam County v. Robertson, 47 Tex. 222 (1877) (motion to vacate
judgment of Supreme Court rendered 7 years before, because of the death of a defendant
which had been noted on the record prior to judgment, denied because of laches).
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Bill of Review or Bill in the Nature of a Bill of Review. The distinction
between a bill of review and a bill in the nature of a bill of reviev, as
stated by Mr. Justice Story, was largely formal in his time:
"As the original decree which it [the bill of review] seeks to review
was properly, according to our course of practice, to be deemed
recorded and enrolled as of the term in which the final decree was
passed, it is certainly a bill of review in contradistinction to a bill
in the nature of a bill of review; which latter bill lies only when
there has been no enrollment of the decree. Being a bill brought by
the original parties and their privies in representation, it is also
properly a bill of review in contradistinction to an original bill in
the nature of a bill of review; which latter bill brings forward the
interests affected by the decree other than those which are founded
in privity of representation." 109
This same line of demarcation is stated in his treatise on equity plead-
ing.200 Today, the basis for a bill of review has been expanded to cover
fraud, and bills bringing forward this ground are oftentimes referred
to as bills in the nature of bills of review; but this is merely a termi-
nological development.
The origin of the bill of review is to be found in the first Ordinance of
Lord Chancellor Bacon, which provided:
"No decree shall be reversed, altered, or explained, being once
under the great seal, but upon bill of review; and no bill of review
shall be admitted, except it contain either error in law, appearing in
the body of the decree, without further examination of matters in
fact, or some new matter which hath risen in time after the decree,
and not any new proof which might have been used when the
decree was made. Nevertheless, upon new proof that is come to
light after the decree made, and could not possibly have been used
at the time when the decree passed, a bill of review may be grounded
by the special license of the court, and not otherwise." 11
198. ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110, § 196. Illustrative of statutory limita-
tion is the following Illinois provision:
"The writ of error coram nobis is hereby abolished, and all errors in fact, com-
mitted in the proceedings of any court of record, and which, by common law, could
have been corrected by said writ, may be corrected by the court in which the error
was committed, upon motion in writing, made at any time within five years after
the rendition of final judgment in the case, upon reasonable notice. When the por-
son entitled to make such motion shall be an infant, non compos mentis or under
duress, at the time of passing judgment, the time of such disability shall be excluded
from the computation of said five years."
199. Whiting v. Bank of the Umiited States, 13 Pet. 6, 13,37 (U. S. 1839).
200. STORY EQUITY PLEADI.GS (10th ed., 1892) §§ 403,409.
201. See 2 STREET, EQUITY PRAkCTIcE (1909) 1256 where the Ordinance is cet out; alko
Purcell v. Coleman, 4 Wall. 519,521 (U. S. 1866); Hill v. Phelps, 101 Fed. 650, 651 (C. C. A.
8th, 1900).
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As Street pointed out this Ordinance appears to authorize a bill of
review in three classes of cases: (1) for error of law apparent in the body
of the decree (or in American practice, error apparent on the face of
the record); 202 (2) newly discovered evidence; and (3) for new matter
or new facts occurring after the decree is entered. 211 Street thought,
however, that the third ground was not a basis for a bill of review. 2 4
The clear statement by the Supreme Court in Scotten v. Littlefield 206
would bear him out, at least as to federal practice:
"Bills of review are on two grounds: first, error of law apparent on
the face of the record without further examination of matters of
fact; second, new facts discovered since the decree, which should
materially affect the decree and probably induce a different re-
sult." 20
But what the Court adjudged in the Scotten case was that a subsequent
decision by it in another case based on principles which, if applied,
would have produced different results in the earlier decree now at-
tacked, does not show error apparent in that decree, nor is it new mat-
ter in pais sufficient to sustain a bill of review. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the bill of review is proper to ob-
tain relief from an equitable decree based upon a prior judgment or
decree that is subsequently reversed, just as audita querela gives
relief from a judgment at law under similar circumstances.2, Hence
the conclusion that historically there were three grounds for a bill of
review, as heretofore enumerated, would appear sound.2 3
202. "It has also been suggested at the bar, that no bill of review lies for errors of law,
except where such errors are apparent on the face of the decree of the court. That is true in
the sense in which the language is used in the English practice. In England, the decree
always recites the substance of the bill and answer and pleadings, and also the facts on which
the court found its decree. But in America, the decree does not ordinarily recite either the
bill, or answer, or pleadings; and generally not the facts on which the decree is founded.
But with us the bill, answer and other pleadings, together with the decree, constitute what Is
properly considered as the record. And, therefore, in truth, the rule in each country is pre-
cisely the same, in legal effect; although expressed in different language-viz., that the bill of
review must be founded on some error apparent upon the bill, answer, and other pleadings,
and decree; and that you are not at liberty to go into the evidence at large in order to es-
tablish an objection to the decree, founded on the supposed mistake of the court in its own
deductions from the evidence." Mr. Justice Story-in Whiting v. Bank of the United States,
13 Pet. 13, 14 (U. S. 1839).
203. 2 STREET, EQUITy PRAcTicE (1909) 1256.
204. Ibid.
205. 235 U. S. 407 (1914).
206. Id. at 411.
207. See pp. 667-8, supra.
208. Hill v. Phelps, 101 Fed. 650, 651 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900): "The purpose of a bill of
review is to obtain a reversal or modification of a final decree. There are but three grounds
upon which such a bill can be sustained. They are (1) error of law apparent on the face of
the decree and the pleadings and proceedings upon which it is based, exclusive of the evi-
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Fraser v.
Doing 211 was of the opinion, based upon lower federal court cases, that
fraud in procuring the decree had also become recognized as a ground
for a bill of reiew. Ahile Story recognized fraud as a basis for im-
peaching a decree, he thought that it could be brought forward only
by an original action-"an original bill in the nature of a bill of re-
view." 210 But the opinion expressed in Fraser v. Doing seems to have
become established law by virtue of Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v.
Hartford-Empire Company 211 subsequently discussed.
The bill of review was a device whereby an equity court could grant
relief from a final decree rendered by it at a previous term of court.
Since the equity court, like the common law court, had control over a
proceeding until a final decree had been entered, there was no reason
to bring a bill of review to have an interlocutory decree set aside and
hence it would not lie. -212 Also, since the equity court could, during the
same term, give relief from a final decree on a petition for rehearing, a
bill of review was not proper until that time had ex.pired. 13 This
principle has been carried forward under the Federal Rules to the ex-
tent that a bill of review is premature so long as the final decree is sub-
ject to correction by a motion for new trial under Rule 59.214 It is,
then, when the decree has become final and the court has otherwise lost
control over its decree that the principles of the bill of review become
important.2 15
The bill of review for error of law apparent upon the record was
narrower in scope than the petition for rehearing under which both
conclusions of law and fact could be attacked. It was in the nature of a
writ of error, but sought the determination of the same court which
had rendered the judgment rather than that of an appellate court; and
it was normally required to be brought within the time allowed for
appeal, subject to further limitation by laches. Since the bill of review
dence; (2) new matter which has arisen since the decree; and (3) newly-discovered evidence,
which could not have been found and produced, by the use of reasonable diligence, before
the decree was rendered." Accord: Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. McSherry Mfg. Co., 155 Fed. 521
(C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
209. See note 44, supra.
210. STORY, EQuiTY PLE.%DINGS (10th ed., 1892) § 426.
211. 322 U. S. 238 (1944).
212. John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros., 258 U. S. 82 (1921) set out and discuszed, p. 641,
s$pra.
213. Obear-Nester Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 61 F. (2d) 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932);
3 MooRE at 3259.
214. Fraserv. Doing, note 44, supra.
215. If, of course, Rule 60(b) is construed to apply to interlocutory orders, asit vwould be
proper to construe it by analogy to the California practice, and the federal court5 no longer
have the control over such orders that they had prior to the Federal Rules, the reason for
limiting bills of review to final decrees would no longer exist. For discuczion of power over
interlocutory orders, see supra, pp. 641-3.
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for error apparent served the function of a writ of error, it could be
filed as of right without leave of court, subject to the fact that a pend-
ing appeal or a prior remand under which the final decree was entered
pursuant to a mandate from the appellate court might make applica-
tion to the appellate court necessary.21 The type of errors were
thus described:
.. . an erroneous construction of a statute, or insufficiency of
averments in the bill, or a want of federal jurisdiction apparent on
the face of the record, or procedure which, apparent on the record,
did not constitute due process of law, or a fundamental and mate-
rial departure from regular procedure, were all held to be proper
bases for bills of review. But mere technical errors or irregularities
of procedure could not successfully be made the foundation of a
bill; such defects could not open up a decree which rendered sub-
stantial justice between the parties on the merits of the contro-
versy." 217
Under Rule 59, a motion for a new trial on such ground must be made
not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment. To counterbalance
this shrinking in the time during which a court may correct its own
errors by granting a new trial, the substance of the bill of review still
serves some function.
During the term at which a final decree had been entered a petition
for rehearing based on newly discovered evidence could be used. After
the term this general function was served by the bill of review; but was
granted only on the strongest showing, since it tended to deter the
reasonable finality of litigation. The new matter or evidence relied on
had to be of such a controlling nature as would probably induce a
different conclusion than that on which the former decision was based.
The granting of the bill was within the discretion of the trial court,
subject to review by the appellate courts only where there was evidence
of abuse. The only time limitation was the equitable doctrine of
laches. 21 Since the motion for new trial on the basis of newly dis-
covered evidence is singled out for special attention by Rule 59(b) and
given a longer time during which it may be made to the trial court,
i.e., before the expiration of the time for appeal, a reasonable construc-
tion is that such a method for opening up a judgment for newly dis-
covered testimony is exclusive, subject, of course, to the right, in an
exceptional case, to bring an independent action to enjoin the judg-
ment. 19
216. DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 762-3; 3 MOORE at 3259, 3261-2; 2 Street,
EQUITY PRACTICE (1909) §§ 2129, 2130.
217. 3 MOORE at 3260-1.
218. DOBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 763-4; SIMXUNS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (rev.
ed. 1934) § 891; 3 MoORE at 3263-4.
219. See 3 MooRE at 3264-5. This conclusion is supported by the theory of Wallace v.
[Vol. 55: 623
19461 FEDERAL RELIEF FROM CIVIL JUDGMENTS G79
A third basis for a bill of review is the occurrence of new matter or
new facts after the entry of the decree which make its enforcement
inequitable, such as the reversal of a prior judgment or decree upon
which the decree in question was bottomed. Here the only time limita-
tion would be laches. 22"
The final ground for a bill of review is fraud in procuring the decree.
This can best be illustrated by a discussion of Hazel-Atlas Glass Com-
pany v. Hartford-Empire Company.22 Hartford filed an application
for a patent in 1926 and was confronted with considerable Patent
Office opposition. In order to help along the application, certain
officials and attorneys of Hartford prepared an article and had it
published in a trade magazine in 1926 under the name of the president
of the Flint Glass Workers' Union. Later in that year the article was
introduced as part of the record before the Patent Office. The patent
issued January 3, 1928. About six months later Hartford brought an
action to enjoin infringement by Hazel and for an accounting. The
article was in the record, only as part of the "file-wrapper" history and
seemingly played no important part before the district court, where
the case was tried in 1929 and resulted in 1930 in a dismissal of the
action on the ground that no infringement had been proved. On appeal
to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the attorneys for Hartford called the
court's attention to the article in their brief; and that court apparently
gave considerable weight to the article when on May 5, 1932, it held
the patent valid and infringed. On Hazel's application the time for
filing a petition for rehearing was extended five times, but it never
filed such a petition due to the fact that Hazel and Hartford entered
into a settlement agreement, and so on July 30, 1932, the mandate of
the appellate court went down to the district court. Hazel had had
some intimation of the existence of the fraud at the time of the trial
and decision on appeal, but had been unable to obtain detailed in-
formation, and the facts did not come out in full until nine years later
at which time and on November 19, 1941, Hazel filed a petition in the
court of appeals for leave to file a bill of review in the district court.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that since any fraud practiced had
been practiced on it, the court should itself pass upon the question
whether the mandate should be recalled and the case reopened, but
relief was denied on the merits. The Supreme Court reversed "with
directions to set aside the 1932 judgment of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, recall the 1932 mandate, dismiss Hartford's appeal, and issue a
mandate.to the District Court directing it to set aside its judgment
United States, set out and discussed in text accompanying note 36 supra. For propczed
change of Rules 59(b) and 60(b) relative to newly discovered evidence, -ee pp. 0S9, 691,
693, infra.
220. See note 160 supra; SnIMMS, FEDERAL PRACTIcE (rev. ed. 1934) § S90.
221. 322 U. S. 238 (1944).
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entered pursuant to the Circuit Court of Appeals' mandate, to reinstate
its original judgment denying relief to Hartford, and to take such addi-
tional action as may be necessary and appropriate." 222 Mr. Justice
Black, for the majority, said that while there was a general rule against
setting aside decrees after the expiration of the term, there was also a
rule of equity to the effect that relief could be granted against decrees,
regardless of the term, for after-discovered fraud, "by bills of review
or bills in the nature of bills of review, or by original proceedings to
enjoin enforcement of a judgment." 223 He did not classify the fraud
involved in the case as intrinsic or extrinsic, but cited both Marshall v.
Holmes and United States v. Throckmorton, which have been thought to
stand for different propositions: (1) that either intrinsic or extrinsic
fraud is sufficient basis for an independent equitable action to en-
join,-the Marshall case; (2) that only extrinsic fraud is a basis for such
an action,-the Throckmorton case. 224 He did state, however, that
"This is not simply a case of a judgment obtained with the aid of a
witness who, on the basis of after-discovered evidence, is believed
possibly to have been guilty of perjury. Here, even if we consider
nothing but Hartford's sworn admissions, we find a deliberately
planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent
Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals." 225 The Court also held
(1) that whether or not Hazel had exercised proper diligence, the fraud
could not be condoned, especially since "there are issues of great
moment to the public in a patent suit;" 221 (2) that as the issue of fraud
was clear and not in dispute the appellate court hed the power and the
duty itself to pass on the issue and to vacate its judgment, and was not
required to send the case to the district court for decision; 22 (3) that
the effect of the fraud called for a complete denial of relief to Hartford
222. Id. at 251.
223. Id. at 245.
224. See p. 648, supra.
225. 322 U. S. 238, 245-6 (1944).
226. Id. at 246.
227. In footnote 5, 322 U. S. 249, Mr. Justice Black states: "We do not hold, and would
not hold, that the material questions of fact raised by the charges of fraud against Hartford
could, if in dispute, be finally determined on ex parte affidavits without examinations and
cross examinations of witnesses. It should again be emphasized that Hartford has never
questioned the accuracy of the various documents which indisputably show fraud on the
Patent Office and the Circuit Court, and has not claimed, either here or below, that a trial
might bring forth evidence to disprove the facts as shown by these documents. And insofar
as a trial would serve to bring forth additional evidence showing that Hazel was not diligent
in uncovering these facts, we already have pointed out that such evidence would not in this
case change the result.
"Moreover, we need not decide whether, if the facts relating to the fraud were it dispute
and difficult of ascertainment, the Circuit Court here should have held hearings and decided
the case or should have sent it to the District Court for decision. Cf. Art Metal Works,
v. Abraham & Strauss, 107 F. (2d) 940."
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for the claimed infringement of the patent. Mr. Justice Roberts, for
the minority, contended: (1) that the court of appeals had no power to
revise its judgment after the expiration of the term; (2) that original
jurisdiction had not been conferred by Congress upon that court and
hence it had no authority to try the issues "of what is essentially an
independent cause and enter a judgment of first instance on the facts
and the law" 223 either on affidavits or by a "full dress trial;" 2- (3) that
Hazel was not remediless since the fraud involved was extrinsic and
this would support a bill of review filed, with leave of the appellate
court, in the district court; and (4) that this procedure was preferable
since it would permit "a deliberate and orderly trial of the issu" 2
which involved, in addition to fraud, laches and the problem of a
deliberate settlement by Hazel with Hartford. Because of the different
theories of the majority and minority it seems clear that the decision
stands for the propositions that a bill of review does not invoke original
jurisdiction but is for that purpose a continuation of the former litiga-
tion; and that there is no arbitrary time limit on the power to grant
relief. It fails to give clear answer as to whether etrinsic fraud is
necessary to afford relief. But since the proposed amendments to
Rule 60(b) would add "fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party" as a ground for relief by motion made within one year, while
preserving without time limit the power of a court to set aside a judg-
ment for fraud upon it, importance in distinguishing the type of fraud
will shift to "fraud upon the court," if the amendment is adopted.2 31
The cases are in conffict as to whether a bill of review is such an
independent action that it cannot be maintained against the United
States, absent some express statutory authorization..2 12 Since the
Supreme Court has ruled that audita querela may not be maintained
against the United States,23 3 it would be reasonable to conclude that
its equitable counterpart, the bill of review, could not. But this con-
clusion is at war with the theory of the Hazel-Atlas case which regards
the bill of review as a continuation of the original litigation so that
original jurisdiction is not invoked by it. Even if the conclusion is
maintained, the substance of the bill of review would be available
228. 322 U. S. 238, 258 (1944).
229. Id. at 257.
230. Id. at 271.
231. See p. 691, infra.
232. Zegura v. United States, 104 F. (2d) 34 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (may not be main-
tamined; other grounds of the decision were laches and no basis for the bill), cert. d.nied,
308 U. S. 586 (1939). Contra: Bush v. United States, 13 Fed. 625 (C. C. D. Ore. 1882).
Gherwal v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 998 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cited by the 7cgura case
as in accord with its holding involved an independent suit in equity and not a bill of review.
233. Avery v. United States, 12 Wall. 304 (U.S. 1870); and see p. 669, supra.
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against the United States by motion made in the original proceeding,
subject only to such time limitations as would apply if the formal bill
of review were being maintained, under the theory of Jones v. Watts.23 4
COMPARISON OF RULE 60(b) AS Now INTERPRETED WITH STATE
PRACTICE
As now interpreted, Rule 60(b) keeps alive the ancient doctrines
surrounding the traditional common law and equitable ancillary
remedies in a modern code procedure. To determine whether con-
tinuation of these concepts is desirable to achieve an efficient com-
promise between the policies of according justice to the parties and
terminating litigation swiftly, the federal practice may be compared
with that of the state which exceeds all others in volume of litigation-
New York.
Although it is largely impossible to ascertain how much substance
of the old remedies remain in most states," the case of In re Grays'
Will 235 pronounces New York's unfavorable attitudes towards them.
This action involved an independent suit to'set aside and restrain the
enforcement of a default foreclosure decree against an executrix on the
ground that the mortgagee had falsely represented to the executrix
that the mortgage debt remained unpaid and that such fraud induced
the default in the foreclosure action. A motion to dismiss was sus-
234. See p. 669, supra.
235. Professor Orfield in his discussion as to whether the writ of error comm nobis is
absolute concludes:
"It is believed that the courts in every state grant the relief given under the writ either
by virtue of decision or statute. Decisions of the federal courts and of thirty states grant
relief by the writ or by motion in civil cases. Four other states grant the relief in criminal
cases and would doubtless grant relief in civil cases. It is to be doubted whether the courts
of any jurisdiction would refuse relief if the issue were squarely presented." Orfield, Tho
Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Practice (1934) 20 VA. L, REv. 423, 427.
Some courts have upheld the substance of the remedies but have found the procedural
aspects distasteful. Billups v. Freeman, 5 Ariz. 268, 52 Pac. 367 (1898) (where an applica-
tion for the writ of error coram nobis was considered as though it were a motion to vacate
the judgment).
Whether the substance of the legal and equitable remedies is available often depends
upon a detailed review of the statutory and sometimes constitutional history of the particular
forum. Boyd v. Smith, 200 Ga. 687, 205 N. W. 522 (1925) (Writ of coram nobis held un-
available because of the broad statutory grounds upon which a judgment may be vacated or
modified, even though the statute did not cover the case at hand), writ of error dismissed
270 U. S. 635 (1926); Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N. W. 339 (1935) (held that, although
the statutory provisions for relief were extensive, the writ of coram nobis was available
where the statutory grounds were not adequate); In re Ernst, 179 Wis. 646, 192 N. W. 65
(1923) (held the constitutional provision which retained the common law as part of the
law of the state until altered by the Legislature continued the writ of coram nobis except
where other remedies had been substituted); see also notes 74 and 75 supra.
236. 169 Misc. 985, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 850 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
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tained on the ground that only intrinsic fraud was involved.2 7 As to
the contention that the action could be sustained as a bill of review,
Justice Bergan stated:
"[Under the English practice,] the impression of the great seal and
the enrollment of the decree were matters of grave solemnity ...
A separate suit resulting in a new decree of equal formality seemed
to be the only logical device for the alteration or change in a decree
consistent with that concept of finality.
"The present New York practice, in equity as in law, is far more
elastic. . . . [B]oth reason and necessity for the bill of review as a
separate suit in equity have disappeared, and it is fully within the
power of the court, as a matter of policy, to decline to entertain a
separate complaint for relief in this form and to remit a party other-
wise showing good ground to the ample protection of the statutory
practice." 23
The approach of this case was to evaluate the need for the old com-
mon law and equitable remedies in the light of the statutory remedies
for relief from judgment and to conclude that the former were no
longer useful. In this connection it is well to note the various remedies
and time limits in New York which are in general longer than in the
federal system. A judgment entered without proper jurisdiction, which
would be subject to collateral attack, may be vacated upon motion.
This power does not depend upon any statute, but is said to be in-
herent in the court.23  Clerical mistakes may be corrected at any time
pursuant to Section 105 of the Civil Practice Act, a provision com-
parable to Rule 60(a). Concerning the time allowed to enter notice of
an appeal, New York practice makes a distinction between default and
non-default judgments: that the former are non-appealable "unless an
appeal therefrom be expressly authorized by law." 211 In appealable
cases the general time for appeal from the supreme court to the ap-
pellate division is "thirty days after service upon the attorney for the
appellant of a copy of the judgment or order appealed from and a
written notice of the entry thereof"; 241 the general time for an appeal
237. "If perjury upon a trial is not a sufficient ground for the relief cought, it would Cen
that an unsworn misrepresentation by a plaintiff to a defendant of the merits of a defense
would constitute no better ground. So it 'vas indicated in Cro use v. MccViar, 207 N. Y.
213, 100 N. E. 697 .. . I think this case is not distinguishable from that one and Judge
Cardozo, in restating the rule upon that and other authorities in Fuhrmann v. Fanroth,
254 N. Y. 479, 482, 173 N. E. 685, 687, pointed out that the relief is granted only upon the
basis of some 'covinous device' of fraud affectingithe very means bywhich the judgment
was obtained, but added that 'the rule is less rigid where the application for relief is by mo-
tion in the action.' " In re Gray's Will, 169 Misc. 985, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 850, 852-3 (Sup. Ct.
1939).
238. Id. at 854.
239. 5 CARMODY'S NEW YoR PRAcric (perm. ed.) § 1516.
240. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 557.
241. Id. at § 612.
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as of right to the court of appeals is sixty days 242 and for permissive
appeals a varying time, depending in part upon term time of the ap-
pellate division. 243 In reference to a motion for new trial, Carmody
states that where the motion is based on error in a finding of fact or
ruling upon the law, the motion must be made before the expiration of
the time within which an appeal may be taken; in other cases, the
motion must be made within a reasonable time.244 Tb us it can be seen
that as to non-default judgments the trial court has extensive power
over its judgments through granting a new trial, and there would in
truth be little reason to sustain a bill of review in New York based on
newly discovered evidence or fraud.
In relation to default judgments Section 108 provides that a court
in its discretion may relieve a party, at any time within one year after
notice, from a proceeding taken against him through his mistake, in-
advertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Carmody states, however,
that this power is not solely statutory but inherent and that courts,
"in the exercise of their control over their own judgments, may open
such judgments upon the application of any one adversely affected by
the judgment upon sufficient reason, in the furtherance of justice." 246
In relation to all types of judgments, two other sections should be
noted. Section 521 provides that a motion to set aside a final judgment
for irregularity shall not be heard after the expiration of one year since
the filing of the judgment, unless the hearing is adjourned until after
the year has expired or the terrh for which the hearing is noticed is not
held. Section 522 provides that a motion to set aside a final judgment
for error in fact not arising upon the trial may be made by the party
against whom it is rendered; or if execution has not been issued and
the judgment has not been wholly or partly satisfied or enforced, by
the party in whose favor it is rendered. The time period for relief under
Section 522 is two years, except in the case of certain named disabilities
where the time can be extended up to five years but not more than one
year after the disability ceases. 246 But again Carmody cautions that:
"it is to be remembered that the court, in its inherent power and
control over its own proceedings, may vacate a judgment on other
grounds, where it appears that substantial justice will be subserved
and injustice prevented thereby." 247
And, of course, the independent action in equity exists "to cancel judg-
ments, or to enjoin their enforcement in whole or in part, upon equita-
ble grounds, such as fraud in the procurement of the judgment." 248
242. Id. at § 592.
243. Id. at § 592.
244. 4 CARMODY, op. cit. supra, note 239 at § 1439.
245. 5 Id. at § 1522.
246. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT, § 528.
247. 5 CARMODY, op. cit. supra, note 239 at § 1513, pp. 3581-2.
248. Id. at § 1512; and see Grouse v. McVickar and In re Gray's Will, note 237, supra.
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'When the various New York statutory procedures and their ac-
companying time provisions, together with the doctrine of inherent
power, are considered and compared with the relatively short time pe-
riods in the federal practice 249 it can be seen that the New York courts
probably have more extensive control over their judgments, without
the necessity of resorting to the common law and equitable remedies,
than the federal courts have even with such remedies. Thus, it would
appear possible to devise a satisfactory civil procedural system omitting
the traditional remedies altogether.
In the final analysis the issue is as to how far the principle of finality,
of judgments must yield in a particular case to a court's desire to
prevent inequity. Freeman makes this pertinent summary and com-
ment:
"Notwithstanding general concurrence in the principle . . . as
to the finality of judgments after the term, it is generally held in-
applicable to void judgments, and by most courts exceptions are
made or limitations imposed in the case of judgments obtained ir-
regularly or by fraud. In fact, principles about as ample and liberal
as those recognized at equity, upon application to vacate decrees
where there has been no hearing on the merits, seem to be applied
to judgments in some states. . . . [I]n New York judgments seem
to be regarded not as inviolate and enduring testimonials, but as
temporary structures, to be torn down, remodeled or rebuilt when-
ever the builders feel competent to improve the original workman-
ship or design." 20
Su niAIY; CRITIcIsM; AND R-ECOMIIENDATIONS
The Federal Rules which affect the finality of judgments have
worked well in practice. No glaring defects have been exposed. Cer-
tain ambiguities have developed, however, and some structural weak-
nesses have been exposed. These may be summarized in this manner.
The continued existence of a term of court has been relied on to give a
court power over its judgments, despite the theory of Rule 6(c) that
term time should not affect the court's power in any way. Due to the
fact that Rule 6(b), giving the court power to enlarge periods of time,
expressly excepted only Rule 59 governing new trial, it could reason-
ably be argued that the time limits of Rules 50(b),2 1 52(b),2 2 and
60(b), which directly affect the finality of judgments, could be ex-
249. 10 days for a new trial, except on the ground of newly discovered evidence where
the time limit is appeal time, Rule 59(b); 10 days to move for judgment n.o.v. under Rule
50(b); 10 days to amend findings, Rule 52(b); six months for relief from a judgment (other
than clerical mistakes) under Rule 60(b); and the general appeal time of 3 months.
250. 1 FREEM-AN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 198.
251. Motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict.
252. Amendment of findings and judgment.
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tended. If this construction were adopted the finality of judgments
would be at large. Relative to the direct operation of Rule 60 govern-
ing relief from a judgment or order, there is no serious basis for criti-
cism, although there are structural weaknesses and the rule can no
doubt be improved. A minor ambiguity has developed under Rule 60(a)
as to which court, trial or appellate, has power to permit the correction
of clerical mistakes pending an appeal. 253 As far as subdivision (b), the
substantive part of Rule 60 is concerned, more important animadver-
sions are in order. First, the initial sentence adapted from the Califor-
nia code is deficient in not expressly including fraud as a basis of a mo-
tion for relief from a judgment, although this deficiency has been cured
by judicial construction. Second, the adapted California provision is
deficient in that it is subject to the construction that it applies to
interlocutory orders as well as final orders, although the rule should
limit power only over the latter type of judgment. Third, the pronoun
"his" is too restrictive in that it authorizes a party to be relieved from
a judgment only when it is taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, although the mistake or
neglect of others may be just as material and call just as much for
supervisory jurisdiction. Fourth, the adapted provision gives a maxi-
mum time period of only six months in which relief by motion may be
obtained and this is probably too short. Fifth, the scope of the first
saving clause which preserves the power of a court to entertain an
action is ill defined.
This latter point deserves more extended comment. The federal
cases which have considered the first saving clause are in complete
harmony on the proposition that it preserves the substance of the
ancillary common law and equitable remedies, except insofar as their
substance is specifically covered ,by some rule, and that in addition it
preserves the independent action in equity; that the substance of the
ancillary remedies may be obtained by motion in the original action;
and that this motion is not subject to a six months' time limit but may
be made at any time subject to the doctrine of laches. As a conse-
quence the scope of the saving clause is shrouded in ancient lore and
mystery. Perhaps because the judicial power is so vaguely restricted,
Rule 60(b) has worked fairly satisfactorily. At any rate it has. Insofar
as the result reached in one case is a proper basis for the criticism of a
rule, Wallace v. United States 254 appears to indicate that the rule is too
253. Some courts have thought that upon the taking of an appeal the district court lost
its power to permit correction. See Schram v. Safety Investment Co., 45 F. Supp. 636 (E. D.
Mich. 1942); also Miller v. United States, 114 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). For the view
that clerical mistakes may be corrected by the trial court before the appeal is docketed and
thereafter by the appellate court, during the pendency of the appeal, see Perlman v. 322
West Seventy-Second Street Co., Inc., 127 F. (2d) 716 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); 3 Moopm at 3276.
254. 142 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), discussed at pp. 636-7, 641, supra.
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restrictive. The Wallace case need not be criticized on the ground of
its interpretation. In fact it seems correctly to interpret the first saving
clause as retaining the ancillary common law and equitable remedies
and to conclude that relief could not be granted under them-in this
suit by analogy to coram nobis. It is the result which may be cen-
sured-that the Rule, despite the first saving clause, did not afford
sufficient power to set aside the improper dismissal of an action and
compelled the Second Circuit to set aside a judgment on the merits.
In more general terms utilization of the common law and equitable
remedies seems objectionable on the following grounds. It compels an
historical search for and approach to remedies that are not geared to a
united procedure. And if, nevertheless, these remedies are expanded
by judicial construction so that the common law remedies may be uti-
lized in present civil actions formerly equitable and the equitable
remedies may be utilized in present civil actions formerly legal, in
addition to the type of action out of which they grew, there will still be
situations, because of the historical growth of the old remedies, where
relief will not be afforded, although these are as meritorious as situa-
tions where relief is granted.21
In considering amendments to the Federal Rules the Advisory Com-
mittee dealt very tentatively with this problem of finality in its Pre-
liminary Draft of Proposed Amendments in 1944. It made no proposal
concerning Rule 6(c) dealing with term time. Relative to enlargement
of time under Rule 6(b) it submitted three alternatives. The first
alternative was to retain the rule without amendment. As noted, under
one construction this would leave the finality of judgments indeter-
minate. The second alternative proposed to strike out the limitation
upon the coart's power to enlarge the period of time under Rule 59;
and, so far as the problem of judgments is concerned, prohibit the
court only from enlarging the period of time stated in Rule 60(b).
Under this alternative the court could permit a motion to be made at
any time without limit under Rule 50(b) for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, under Rule 52(b) for amendment of findings and modifica-
tion or vacation of an existing judgment, and under Rule 59 for new
trial. This alternative would definitely make both appeal time and
ultimate finality indefinite. The argument for it was that courts should
have the widest discretion, on a proper showing at any time, to relieve a
party from an unjust judgment, and that such relief is more important
than fixing a definite time for ending the litigation and producing
finality of judgments. While this general objective seems laudable,
it would appear better attained by putting definite time limits on
motions under Rules 50(b), 52(b) and 59, which affect both appeal
255. See particularly the New Eng/and Furniture & Carpa Co. cazes, and Urit, Stoles
v. Mayer, discussed at pp. 673, 670, supra.
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time and finality, and by enlarging the court's power under Rule 60(b),
which affects only finality. The third alternative adopted this view to
the extent that it prohibited the enlargement of the periods of time
under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59, and 60(b). In reference to Rule 60, the
Committee clarified subdivision (a), relative to the correction of clerical
mistakes pending an appeal.256 Relative to subdivision (b) the Com-
mittee struck out the restrictive pronoun "his"; and added "fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party" as an
express ground for relief by motion made within a maximum period of
six months. It made no attempt to clarify the first saving clause,
although it stated in its note that "Some members . . . have had the
impression the writ of error coram nobis, at common law, and the bill
of review in equity, were abolished by these rules . . ."; that the
matter was in doubt and was the subject of further study.257 The
proposed amendment was deficient in that it failed to make Rule 60(b),
with its limitations, apply only to final judgments. If the ancillary
remedies were not retained as thought by some of the committee mem-
bers, the rule would still be subject to the following criticism:
(1) provision for relief would be available only within an unduly
short period time;
(2) it is productive of harsh and inequitable results to enumerate
exclusive situations when relief can be afforded by motion; and when
this is done courts will invent some means of escape as by the doctrine
of inherent power, or the doctrine that the term of court gives power;
(3) the Rule would give relief from judgments in favor of the United
States only within the six months period, since an independent action.
in equity cannot be maintained against the United States;
(4) the Rule would, under one line of authorities, afford relief from
intrinsic fraud, accident or mistake only within the six months period,
and yet the distinction between what is intrinsic and what is extrinsic
(the basis of an independent action) is difficult if not impossible to
draw;
(5) the Rule would afford no relief, except in the situations where
the independent action would be available, on facts occurring subse-
quent to the judgment and which render enforcement of the judgment
inequitable, as where a change of circumstances warrants a modifica-
tion or vacation of a final injunction, or where.the judgment in ques-
tion is based upon a prior judgment that is subsequently reversed.
The Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments in 1945
represented a more considered appraisal of the entire problem and did
256. It adopted the view of the Perlman case set forth in note 253, supra. Subject to some
improvement in language it again appears as a proposed amendment in the May, 1945 Draft,
and is set forth in note 264, infra.
257. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of May, 1944, p. 73.
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work improvements. The Committee proposed to amend Rule 6(c) to
provide clearly that the continued existence of a term of a court gave
no added power. It adopted the substance of the third alternative
concerning Rule 6(b) of the First Draft by providing that the court
could not extend the time for taking any action under Rule 50(b),
52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 211 60(b), and 73(a).2 1 However, it struck out
of Rule 59(b) the provision that a motion for a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence may be made within appeal time, vith
leave of court obtained on notice and hearing and on a showing of due
diligence. Such a motion, as all other motions for a new trial, would
now have to be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the
judgment. Since new evidence can seldom be discovered within that
short period, the motion for new trial on that basis would be prac-
tically eliminated by the proposal. Justification for this can be found
in a correlative amendment to Rule 60(b) making newly discovered
evidence a basis for relief from a judgment within the maximum period
of a year. The proposed change of Rule 59(b) has two good features.
The extension of time from three months (the present normal time for
appeal) to one year is needed if newly discovered evidence is to be an
effective basis for relief. Yet by removing this ground for relief from
Rule 59, except when urged within 10 days from the entry of judgment,
the time for appeal is not subject to enlargement by the motion. Rela-
tive to appeal time the Committee went further, in conformity to a
resolution of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, and,
speaking generally, proposed an amendment to Rule 73(a) reducing
the time for appeal to a circuit court of appeals from three months to
60 days in government and 30 days in private cases.sc It further
proposed to codify in Rule 73(a) the practice that
258. Subdivision (b) of Rule 59 provides for a motion for new trial, and subdivision (d)
authorizes the court to grant a new trial on its own initiative not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment. Subdivision (e) is a new subdivision which the Second Preliminary
Draft proposed to add, and reads: "(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to
alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judg-
ment."
259. This governs when and how an appeal is taken to the circuit court of appeals.
260. The proposed amendment reads: "The time within which an appeal may be taken
shall be 30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from unless a zhorter time is pro-
vided by law, except that in any action in which the United States is a party the time shall
be 60 days from such entry, and except that upon a showing of excusable neglect bazzd on a
failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment the district court in any action may
e-x-tend the time for appeal not exceeding 30 days from the expiration of the original time
herein prescribed." An allowance of 60 days to all parties in government cases is justified
because the matter of whether an appeal by the government shall be taken must be passed
upon by several persons. See Second Preliminary Draft of 1945, p. 83-4. And if the govern-
ment is given 60 days it is advisable to give all the parties to such a case the Eame time to
avoid complications in the case of cross-appeals. The last exception is a nod in the direction
of Hill v. Hawes, 320 U. S. 520 (1944), without adopting its theory that during term-time the
court can re-enter a judgment so that the losing party who had no notice of its entry may
appeal. See Second Preliminary Draft of 1945, pp. 8--5.
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"The running of the time for appeal as provided in this subdivision
is terminated by a timely motion 261 made pursuant to any of the
rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal fixed in
this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the
entry of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion
under such rules: granting or denying a motion for judgment under
Rule 50(b); or granting or denying a motion under Rule 52(b) or
Rule 59(e) to amend or make additional findings or fact or to alter
or amend the judgment in more than purely formal or mechanical
aspects; 2 2 or denying a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." 203
With the time for appeal reduced and defined the Committee pro-
posed several substantive changes in Rule 60(b). 264 These changes can
261. To be timely the motion under Rules 52(b), 59(b) and (e) must be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of judgment; and under Rule 50(b) not later than 10 days after
reception of the verdict or discharge of the jury where no verdict is returned. This require-
ment that the motion in civil actions be timely represents a definite refusal to apply the
bankruptcy rule to civil actions. In bankruptcy proceedings a motion for a new trial may be
entertained even after the expiration of the time for appeal, and the full time for appeal will
start running anew upon the disposition of the motion. Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-
Illinois Glass Co., 300 U. S. 131 (1937); Bowman v. Loperena, 311 U. S. 262 (1940); Pfister v.
Northern Illinois Finance Corp., 317 U. S. 144 (1942); Chapman v. Federal Land Bank of
Louisville, 117 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941); Missouri v. Todd, 122 F. (2d) 804 (C, C. A.
8th, 1941). Cases which had carefully considered tie problem under the Federal Rules had
held that when the time limits prescribed in the rules had expired, the court lost the right to
entertain a motion for new trial, to vacate or amend the judgment, or for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, as the case may be, and could not thereafter entertain such a motion
and thereby start the appeal time running anew. Safeway Stores v. Coe, 136 F. (2d) 771
(App. D. C. 1943) (distinguishing the bankruptcy rule where the court has no terms; and
stating that since the Federal Rules have abolished terms and substituted therefor various
definite time limits, the same rule should be applied when such time limits expire as was
formerly applied in law and equity actions when term time was effective-see notes 7-10,
supra); Jusino v. Morales &Tio, 139 F. (2d) 946 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944). The proposed amend-
ment repudiates rulings or dicta to the contrary, as in United States v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F.
(2d) 935 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943); Babler v. United States, 137 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943);
Suggs v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 115 F. (2d) 80 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940).
262. This language is adapted from Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co.,
318 U. S. 203, 206 (1943), where it is stated that a motion to amend or supplement the
"findings of fact in more than purely formal or mechanical aspects tolls the appeals statutes,
and that the time for taking an appeal runs from the date of the order disposing of the mo-
tion." Due to the difficulty of determining what is purely formal or mechanical, and to make
sure that the time for appeal is tolled so long as the district court is considering a motion to
add or amend findings, whether or not this would require alteration of the judgment, it is
probably wise to redraft this clause to read: "or granting or denying a motion under Rule
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judg-
ment would be required if the motion is granted; or granting or denying a motion under
Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment."
263. This clause is restricted solely to the denial of a motion for a new trial, since if it Is
granted there is no final judgment from which to appeal. Compare the preceding clause of
the rule dealing with a motion under Rules 50(b), 52(b), and 59(e) where a final judgment
obtains whether the motion be denied or granted.
264. For completeness it should be noted that the Committee proposed to add the fol-
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be graphically shown as follows, with matter proposed to be stricken
out in brackets and new matter in italics.
"On motion [the court], and upon such terms as are just, the coeurt
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order or proceeding [taken against him through his] on the following
grounds: (z) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered eidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); or (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation
or other misconduct of an adverse party. The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time, but in no case [exceeding six months] more than one
year after [such] the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this subdivision does not affect the finality of a judg-
ment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court (1) to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding or (2) to set aside within one year as
provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U. S. C., Title 28, § 113, a
judgment obtained against a defendant not actually personally notified,
or (3) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram
nobis, coram vobis, audita guerela, and bills of rcuiew and bills in the na-
ture of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining relief
from judgments shall be by notion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action."
The proposed substantive changes are these:
(a) Since Rule 60(b) is applicable to final orders only, the court's
power over interlocutory orders is therefore properly not limited.
(b) Any mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is the
basis for relief. Under the present rule it must be that of the party
seeking relief. Here, too, the change is sound.-
(c) Newly discovered evidence is made the basis for relief. By shift-
ing this basis from the new trial rule to Rule 60 it is made more effective,
and the danger of utilizing it to move for a new trial and thus to en-
large appeal time is eliminated. Further, it makes explicit a ground for
relief that was hiddenly contained in the rule by the first saving clause
since newly discovered evidence was a ground for a bill of review.
(d) The express inclusion of fraud as a third ground for relief sup-
plies a technical omission. One difficulty will arise in trying to dis-
tinquish the type of fraud here referred to and which must be availed
lowing at the end of subdivision (a) dealing with clerical mistakes: "During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate
court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the ap-
pellate court." See notes 253, 256, supra.
265. See p. 686, supra.
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of within one year, from fraud upon the court which may under the
newly proposed third saving clause be urged at any time. 6
(e) The period of time for relief under the rule is enlarged from six
months to one year, and is salutary.
(f) The first saving clause is limited to independent actions; and
the last sentence abolishes both the substance and procedure of the old
ancillary remedies at common law and equity.
It is clear from this last change, coupled with the proposed changes
in rules affecting term and appeal time, that the Committee attempted
to state definitely the grounds for and the time when relief from a
judgment could be obtained. Two objections may be made: (1) if an
inclusive rule is to be adopted, the proposed rule is not sufficiently in-
clusive; (2) detailed inclusiveness is not desirable and a very general
directive rule on the use of power is sounder.
In support of the first objection we note that a judgment which was
void for want of either jurisdiction of the subject matter or jurisdiction
of the defendant was subject to collateral attack in any forum at any
time.217 And hence the rule should recognize that a court can purge its
records of void judgments .2  Further, the old ancillary remedies gave
relief in two situations not covered by the proposed rule: the writ of
audita querela at law and the bill of review in equity could be used to
show matter arising, subsequent to the entry of the judgment, by way
of satisfaction, release, or discharge of the judgment; 269 and the writ
and bill could be used to show that a prior judgment, which was made
the basis of a subsequent judgment, had been reversed or otherwise
vacated. 20 It was also settled that a final injunctive decree with
prospective application could be modified or vacated under proper
circumstances. 27 ' And even if these matters were included in the rule,
some general residual clause would probably be necessary to cover
unforeseen contingencies even at the risk of undercutting the principle
266. Since courts exist to do justice, any fraud in the presentation of a case to the court
could plausibly be said to be fraud upon the court, whether it be accomplished through the
bribery of a member of the court or jury, by the use of false or perjured testimony, by con-
cealing or suppressing testimony, by reference in a brief to supposedly impartial authorities
when these are known to be otherwise, or by resorting to any sharp practice that hinders the
fair presentation of a claim or defense. The Committee Note cites Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238 (1944) as an example of fraud upon the court. In this
case, the signature of a supposedly impartial person was procured for an article written by
company officials, and the article was subsequently used in a brief on appeal. See p. 679,
supra. Fraud there was.. But why this was more of fraud upon the court than any type of
fraud that interferes with the administration of justice is not apparent.
267. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226
(1945); Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F. (2d) 313 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
268. See, e.g., the California rule set out in note 22 supra.
269. See notes 155, 208, supra.
270. See note 160 supra.
271. Seenote64supra.
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of inclusiveness. A rule meeting these objections is set forth in the-
footnote.212
On the other hand a directive rule on the use of power could read
as follows:
"On motion, the court, upon such terms as are just, may at any time
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order
or proceeding taken against him where substantial justice requires,
but having due regard for intervening rights and the general desirabil-
ity of the early finality of judgments. A motion under this subdivision
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This
rule does not limit the power of a court (1) to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or
(2) to set dside within one year, as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial
Code, U. S. C., Title 28, §§ 118, a judgment obtained against a defend-
ant not actually personally notified." The heart of the change is
embodied in the first sentence. Perhaps its directive would make the
concept of finality of judgments too closely akin to stare decisis to
meet with satisfaction. But the thesis of this article has been that
finality of judgments is and must be a much more flexible concept in
practice than it is generally thought to be; and that it is desirable to
recognize this fact. Stare decisis and finality are facets of the same
problem, differ only in degree, and produce better results when the
judicial process is free to use their principles with an understanding
flexibility.
272. (Matter stricken out is in brackets; new matter is in italics).
Mistake; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Ac-vly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.
On motion [the court] and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [taken against him through
his] for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excumble neglect; (3)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discoecrcd in tire to mc-v.
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or ex-
trinsic), misrepresentation, or otler misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is raid;
(5) the judgment lias been satisfied, released, or dischargcd, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitade that t'e judgment should
have prospectie application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the opcration of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time [but in no cave exceeding
six months] and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one ycar after [Euch] the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) do.s not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power
of a court [(1)] to entertain an indepement action to relieve a party from a judgment order,
or proceeding, or [(2) to set aside within one year, as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial
Code, U. S. C., Title 28, § 118, a judgment obtained against a defendant not actually par-
sonally notified] to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in
Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U. S. C., Title 28, § 118, or to set aside a judgmmnt forfrau'd
upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram robis, andita querela, and bills of review and bills
in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for oblaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
